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Abstract 
This dissertation aims to illustrate that certain narratives of the Falklands War were the 
products of a failure to account for a public that think in ways that cannot be classified in to 
simple categories. It will argue that the Falklands War remains an area of contested history 
within British discourse, not everyone understood the conflict as the noble crusade that 
Thatcher and newspapers such as The Sun thought it was. 
It will look at how the presentation of the conflict shaped public perception and vice versa, 
how perception of public opinion shaped presentation. It counters the view that the public are 
easily manipulated, rather people are free-thinking individuals. It illustrates how relationships 
between the public, the military, the government and the media interacted to develop certain 
understandings of the conflict. Finally it assesses how the variety of different narratives have 
manifested themselves in later representations of the conflict. It asks what impact memory of 
the Falklands War has had in the thirty years since it occurred. 
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Introduction 
 
The sickening footage broadcast around the world of American journalist James Foley being 
beheaded is a symbolic consequence of a future Derek Mercer expressed thirty years ago; 
‘thousands of journalists roaming around free, unfettered by censorship and communicating 
directly to their offices in Washington, London or Moscow’.1 Foley was a freelance journalist 
reporting on the Syrian civil war when he was kidnapped by rebel forces in 2012. Unlike in 
Iraq, Afghanistan and the Falklands, he was not protected by anyone, not his country’s armed 
forces, not a radio station, TV channel, nor a newspaper. Foley is the counterpoint to the strict 
controls put upon the British Task Force correspondents who reported on the Falklands War. 
The democratisation of war reporting through the use of immediate communications such as 
satellites and the internet has given journalists the freedom to report on what they want, how 
they want. The cost has been their personal safety, this has in some cases led to brutal 
executions witnessed around the world via the same means of communication that gave them 
their journalistic freedom. Reflecting upon the merits of embedding with forces in relation to 
the Falklands War and her own experience during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Caroline Wyatt 
asked: 
…are embeds worth the compromises undoubtedly made by those who rely on the 
military for transport, food and safe lodging, in return for a certain measure of 
security and that crucial access to the frontline?2 
Wyatt’s comment shows that thirty years on there is still debate surrounding the relationship 
between the media, armed forces, government and the public. What balance should be struck 
                                               
1  K. Mercer, D. Mungham and G. Williams, The Fog of War (Cardiff, 1987), p.2. 
2 C. Wyatt, ‘How has embedding changed since the Falklands?’ BBC, 
http://www.live.bbc.co.uk/blogs/blogcollegeofjournalism/posts/falklands_2 (Accessed: 28 August 2014). 
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between the contradictory statement ‘the essence of successful warfare is secrecy; the essence 
of successful journalism is publicity’?3  
If as military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz stated ‘War is merely the continuation of policy 
by other means’4 then it must be emphasised that these means are not confined to the direct 
area of military operations, but are also present on the domestic front where the nurturing of 
public support is fundamental to conducting a successful campaign. Clausewitz believed that 
the ‘means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose’,5 it should not be the case 
that the population of a democratic nation are deceived in order to promote the rights of 
another group; it is a contradictory strategy. 
In the historiography of the Falklands War there have been many criticisms of the way that 
the media were handled, from the Task Force correspondents embedded with the Army, to 
the manipulation of journalists in the parliamentary lobby, of pressurising editors and the 
attacks against the BBC for its neutrality.6 With accusations of manipulation by elites within 
the government and media it is important to see whether such attempts were made.  
On the figurative level Thatcher’s proclamation that ‘we have made Great Britain great 
again’7 appeared to try to use the Falklands as a conflict that had symbolically lay the ghosts 
of economic decline in the 1970s and of Suez to rest. Research by David Sanders has 
disputed the notion that the ‘Falklands Factor’ was the reason Thatcher won the 1983 General 
Election. It has been argued that Thatcher’s fortunes had begun to improve before the conflict 
                                               
3 Mercer Mungham, and Williams, Fog of War, p.3 
4 M. Howard and P. Paret, (trans.), C. Von Clausewitz, On War (Oxford, 2008) p.28. 
5 Ibid., p.29 
6 See; R. Harris, Gotcha: The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis (London, 1983); M. Cockerell, 
P. Hennessy, D. Walker, Sources close to the Prime Minister: inside the hidden world of the news manipulators 
(Michigan, 1984), N. Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (London, 2007); J. Pilger, 
Freedom Next Time (London, 2006). See also works by the NGOs such as Campaign for Press and Broadcast 
Freedom, for example; S. Greenberg and G. Smith, Rejoice! Media Freedom and the Falklands (London, 1982). 
7 Thatcher Archive: CCOPR 486/82, ‘Speech to Conservative Rally at Cheltenham’, 03 July 1982, 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104989  (Accessed: 29 August 2014). 
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because British economy had started to expand shortly prior to the war.8  But, when 
Argentina invaded the Falklands the Thatcher government was still at a low ebb, 
unemployment over 13% in April 1982, inflation high, cuts in public expenditure and social 
provision had sent the government at that time to the lowest approval rating on record.9 In the 
historiography of the Falklands War narratives have focused on the transformation the 
fortunes of Thatcher’s government and the nation. 
After victory in the Falklands the sabre-rattling and xenophobia of parts of the popular press 
were replaced with stories of national revival. Such narratives developed in the same way as 
certain memories of the Second World War became truths.10 Like Dunkirk was transformed 
from a military failure in to a story of British heroism,11 the supposed regeneration caused by 
the Falklands War masked the reality of a fractured Britain. Sententious headlines such as 
‘WE ARE ALL FALKLANDERS NOW12 created an image of a nation unified in its resolve 
after rediscovering its Second World War spirit that had been lost in post-war years of 
imperial decline.  
If the way a nation fights its wars is an expression of its essential characteristics, then how it 
is presented to its members is also a reflection of these. Comparing how the conflict was 
understood at an elite and popular level can reveal what the elites of the country thought the 
nation was, what they wanted it to be and how this differed from what the reality was for 
members of the public. 
                                               
8 D Sanders, H. Ward, D. Marsh, and T. Fletcher, ‘Government popularity and the Falklands war: a re-
assessment’, British Journal of Political Science 17:3 (1987) pp. 281–313. 
9 J. Campbell, The Iron Lady: Margaret Thatcher: From Grocers Daughter to Iron Lady (London, 2009), p.157-
183; H. Clarke, W. Mishler, and Paul Whiteley, ‘Recapturing the Falklands: Models of Conservative Popularity, 
1979-83’, British Journal of Political Science 20:1 (1990) pp. 63-81. 
10 M. Connelly, We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the Second World War (London, 2004). 
11 P. Knightly, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq: 
Third Edition (Baltimore, 2004), pp.252-255. 
12 Editorial, ‘We are all Falklanders now’, The Times, 5 April 1982. 
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It is important to counter those who regard conflict as a force for regeneration. To think of 
Britain’s current and future role in world affair as an extension of its military triumphs is 
dangerous. If British elite understanding of the Falklands War has led to the identification of 
‘combat as a viable means of renewing its people and restoring its glory days, then “the end” 
may be all too close to hand’.13 We must ‘be better prepared to secure our future from the 
trajectories of the past’.14 
The primary focus of this dissertation is to illustrate that certain narratives of the Falklands 
War were the products of a failure to account for a public that think in ways that cannot be 
classified in to simple categories. It will argue that the Falklands War remains an area of 
contested history within British discourse, not everyone saw the conflict as the noble crusade 
that Thatcher and newspapers such as the Sun thought it was. 
To develop an understanding of where in times of conflict the media should align itself in 
relation to the armed forces and the government, and those it serves, the public, it is 
important to know how they operate in relation to each other. One aim of this thesis is to 
assess the levels of public manipulation and then to scrutinise how successfully it affected 
them compared to what some commentators have suggested. Though it is claimed that such 
activities happen every day, are the public passive receivers of messages?  The conscious and 
unconscious ways that people change meanings of messages so that they elicit unintended 
connotations is a product of population where the innumerable variety life experiences 
enables people to resist attempts to influence them. This thesis aims to counter apocalyptic 
views of a dystopian world where the public blindly accept any propaganda.  
It looks at how the presentation of the conflict shaped public perception and vice versa, how 
perception of public opinion shaped presentation. It will counter the view that the public are 
                                               
13 K. Foster, Fighting Fictions: War, Narrative and National Identity (London, 1999), p.155 
14 Ibid.  
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easily manipulated by elites,15 it will show people as free-thinking individuals. In doing so it 
will illustrate how different relationships between the public, the military, the government 
and the media interacted to develop certain understandings of the conflict. 
To show how people think in different ways the dissertation must ask two overarching 
questions. First, to what extent was popular understanding of the war shaped by conscious 
and unconscious factors of media production? And second, can qualitative techniques reveal 
a divergence in opinion between the elites and the public that quantitative techniques alone 
cannot? 
The sources of production to be considered originate at the elite level, the roles of the Task 
Force correspondents, editors, the government, the army and the MoD in influencing the 
content will be analysed. It looks at the motivations for the decisions they made in trying to 
shape how the conflict was understood at the popular level.  It then evaluates the capacity of 
these different groups to influence popular understanding of the conflict and how the variety 
of different narratives have manifested themselves in later representations of the conflict. It 
asks what impact memory of the Falklands War has had in the thirty years since it occurred. 
Consideration must be given vast array of factors that influenced how the war was presented 
to and received by the public. Consequently this dissertation is divided in to four chapters; 
Chapter One considers one of the initial sources of information, the Task Force 
correspondents. It profiles the reporters, looking at their prior histories before proceeding to 
question whether these profiles explained the way they reported, it then asks how their 
experiences during the conflict shaped their reporting.  
                                               
15 See for example, E. S. Herman, N. Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass 
Media (New York, 1998), see also the classic work on the post-structural construction of thought, E. Said, 
Orientalism: 25th Anniversary Ed (London 2003). 
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Chapter Two evaluates elite understandings of the conflict and the role of the media in it. It 
starts by appraising how newspapers positions were influenced by factors that they believed 
would be in their commercial interest. It then looks at how the government understood the 
importance and influence of the media in shaping understanding of the war at the elite and 
popular level. 
Chapter Three discusses how the public understood the conflict and will develop a 
conceptualisation of them not in monolithic or binary terms, but instead as members of 
pluralistic society. It uses quantitative in conjunction with qualitative techniques to help 
explicate complex nature of public opinion. This is to highlight the flaws in the elite 
understanding of the public due to their reliance on quantitative techniques such as opinion 
polls. It challenges the view that sees the elites as having the power to readily control how the 
public think. 
Chapter Four looks at post-conflict representations to further consider how certain memories 
of the conflict have been excluded from a dominant narrative of the war. It demonstrates 
through such mediums that the revival of the nation was not what everyone experienced, 
many felt excluded from the supposed post-war regeneration that the popular press were 
urging people to believe.  
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Chapter One - Task Force Reportage 
 
No honest journalist should be willing to describe himself or herself as 'embedded.' 
To say, 'I'm an embedded journalist' is to say, 'I'm a government Propagandist’.1 
Noam Chomsky 
Most of us decided before landing that our role was simply to report sympathetically 
as possible what the British forces are doing here today.2 
Max Hastings 
The idea that most of the journalists had made a conscious decision prior to the conflict that 
they were going to adopt a pro-British tone in their reportage is misleading. Certainly much 
of the content that made it back to Britain did reflect such sentiments, especially Max 
Hasting’s, but not all of the Task Force correspondents had such clarity of thought. Apart 
from Hastings only ITV reporter Michael Nicholson had significant experience of war 
reporting. To assume all reporters knew what they were going to do is incorrect, many had 
little idea of what was to come. Apart from their own politics the primary influences upon 
their content were the challenges they faced once they had landed ashore. Reporting 
restrictions, the affinities bred by this early example of embedding and a general desire to see 
the troops (rather than the government or the nation) triumph ensured a largely patriotic if 
occasionally jingoistic response from the Task Force correspondents.   
Past experience 
The profiles of the Task Force correspondents have some notable similarities; the most 
obvious being that they were all male (the only female that went was the official artist Linda 
Kitson, whilst Kate Adie believed she was left out because she was a woman).3 Except for 
two reporters, Michael Nicholson and Max Hastings, who had previously worked in battle 
                                               
1 N. Chomsky and D. Barsamian, Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on the Post-9/11 World: Interviews with 
David Barsamian (New York, 2006), p.34 
2 Sunday Times Insight Team, The Falklands War: The Full Story, (London, 1982), p.213. 
3 K. Adie, The Kindness of Strangers: The Autobiography, (London, 2003). 
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zones, there were only three journalists with the Task Force who were the defence 
correspondents for their newspapers, Alistair McQueen Daily Mirror, Ian Bruce Glasgow 
Herald and Dereck Hudson Yorkshire Post. By their own admissions the rest of the Task 
Force correspondents were not the ‘star’ writers, but were ‘solid but unspectacular 
wordsmiths’.4 They were a new generation of reporters who did not to have to do National 
Service,5 nor were they the specialist columnists on defence for their respective organisations.  
Hastings won the journalist of the year for his reporting during Falklands War, his copy was 
even used by other newspapers instead of their own correspondents; as such he can be 
regarded as the most successful reporter to sail with the Task Force.6 Whereas Hastings 
prospered, the majority of the 29 reporters struggled to acclimatise, they had to deal with 
what they saw as inept MoD minders and a system that they felt unnecessarily hindered and 
censored their work. This happened despite ‘official’ leaks from government sources that 
meant the Task Force correspondents ‘had the sour experience of hearing "their" news being 
broken for them on the World Service’.7 How the prior experiences of the correspondents 
influenced their reporting can help explain why some prospered whilst others struggled. 
The correspondent’s personal histories were deep shapers of their perceptions. Kevin Foster 
suggested that ‘what we think of as acts of perception are really acts of recall’8 whilst military 
historian John Keegan felt that when dealing with unfamiliar events an individual ‘will turn 
to look at what someone else has already made of a similar set of events as a guide for his 
own pen’.9 Historical precedents played an important part in helping the reporters make sense 
of unfamiliar events during the Falklands War.  
                                               
4 Foster, Fighting Fictions, p.32. 
5 Mercer, Mungham, and Williams, Fog of War, p.107.  
6 Harris, Gotcha!, p.139. 
7 J. Barnes, ‘The Worst reported War Since Crimea’ The Guardian, Monday 25 February 2002. 
8 Foster. Fighting Fictions, p.12. 
9 J. Keegan, The Face of Battle, (Harmondsworth, 1976), p.62. 
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Hasting’s patriotic position followed his father’s, a reporter during the Second World War, 
quoting him in an article that emphasised that he, like his father before him, was not a neutral, 
‘When one’s nation is at war, reporting becomes an extension of the war effort’.10  Hastings 
propensity towards the British military was not purely because of proximity during the 
conflict, but also because his upbringing had followed a similar path to that of the officer 
class of the British Army, coming from a middle class family and being educated at Oxford 
University.11 
Hastings took a patriotic perspective from the beginning and was predisposed to moderating 
what he wrote. It is illustrative of how the prejudices of individual reporters can influence 
their content that he admitted that whilst some wanted to report on atrocities, or that it had 
been discovered that the Argentinians had napalm12 he was ‘just not going to file that’ 
because the British were using white phosphorus, which he described as being ‘every bit as 
unpleasant’.13  
The BBC’s Task Force correspondent, Robert Fox, described how Hastings was able to profit 
from his experiences and upbringing; ‘he spoke the same language... he [liked] soldiers… got 
on well with them… and spent a lot of [his] working life with them’.14 This affinity with the 
armed forces, combined with the fact that he was ‘military historian… as a reporter he had 
seen the Yom Kippur War… and Vietnam’15 meant he had a better grasp of the workings of 
the military than the other correspondents. His knowledge meant he picked up on the 
idiosyncrasies military terminology, whilst knowing who to befriend meant that he 
sometimes received favourable treatment, such as wrangling himself a place on a helicopter 
                                               
10 Sunday Times Insight Team, The Falklands War, p.213. 
11 Harris, Gotcha!, p.138. 
12 See Image 1. 
13 D. Morrison, and H. Tumber, Journalists at War: Dynamics of News Reporting During the Falklands Conflict 
(Beverly Hills, 1988) p.106 
14 Ibid., p.26. 
15 Fox, Eyewitness Falklands, pp.135-6. 
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back to the fleet in order to get his copy sent. An extreme example of this preferential 
treatment was that he was once able to send an article back via a secret satellite link meant 
only for the SAS.16  
Michael Nicholson had even more experience of working in conflict zones yet nowhere near 
the same level as success. This can partly be attributed to the difficulty of getting video 
material back to Britain, but a significant element was that he struggled with a level of 
control over his content that he was not used to. Nicholson’s fraught relationship with the 
British military was heightened because his experiences had led him to expect more from the 
British than they were willing to give. Task Force correspondent Martin Cleaver juxtaposed 
his own inexperience ‘since it was my first war… I took it as it came’ with Nicholson who 
was ‘too experienced in a way’. Cleaver described how when Nicholson was prevented from 
doing something he had been allowed to in other conflicts he ‘crawled up the wall and around 
the ceilings a few times’.17 
The collective inexperience of the reporters meant that they were more likely to accept the 
censorship and restrictions that Nicholson struggled with. In some cases they tried to emulate 
the self-censorship practised by Hastings rather than the type of radical polemics of other 
established war correspondents, such as John Pilger, who did not sail with the Task Force. 
Pilger reported in detail the hypocrisy of British foreign policy for its rhetoric about the 
Falkland Islander’s right to self-determination whilst at the same time handing over the 
Chagos Islands and its inhabitants to America. Pilger’s tone is radical, describing how the 
Chagos Islanders were ‘ruthlessly expelled’18 to the Mauritius and quoted a former resident 
who said ‘they stole our country and imprisoned us here’.19 Contrast this with the works of 
                                               
16 J. Newsinger, Dangerous Men: The SAS and Popular Culture, (Chicago, 1997), p.31. 
17 Morrison and Tumber, Journalists at War, p.8. 
18 J. Pilger, Freedom next time, (London, 2007), p.8. 
19 Ibid., p.35 
11 
 
reporters such as Gareth Parry of the Guardian, whose newspaper was critical of the conflict; 
Parry stated that there were certain things that he refused to report on because he thought that 
‘to attempt to describe some of the more horrific sights and sounds of a war would be 
unkind’.20 Unlike Hastings, Parry’s motivations were not necessarily to censor stories for the 
British cause, but because he found them unpleasant. Regardless, there were factors external 
to the Task Force correspondents prior experiences that helped shape their reporting.  
Influence on Islands 
The embedding of reporters with front line troops had a significant impact upon the content 
produced by the Task Force correspondents. They were in the thick of the fighting, they 
witnessed the deaths, felt fear, anger and confusion with the soldiers who were sent to 
reclaim the Islands. They yomped with the forces and slept in the same waterlogged 
trenches.21   
Being immersed in the military culture meant that Task Force correspondents struggled to 
entirely incubate themselves from its pervasive influences. Military culture is difficult to 
define, instead of offering a definition it may be of more use to describe its function. Arthur 
Marwick saw culture as a set of beliefs that helps a group of people orientate themselves 
within the world, it gives them identity.22 The military’s culture can be understood as the 
product of a multifarious set of symbols, legends and assumptions suffused with historical 
significance that consolidate themselves in to a set of values and beliefs that are gradually 
inculcated in to its members.23  
                                               
20 G. Parry, ‘Gareth Parry reflects on his time with British forces during the Falklands war’, The Guardian, 3 
July 1982. 
21 M. Nicholson, A Measure of Danger: The Memoirs of Legendary War Correspondent Michael Nicholson: 
Memoirs of a British War Correspondent (London, 2013), p.232 
22 A. Marwick, The New Nature of History: Knowledge, Evidence, Language (London, 2001) p.156. 
23 See, P. Wilson, ‘Defining Military Culture’, The Journal of Military History, 72, (2008), pp.11-41; D. French,  
The British Way in Warfare 1688 – 2000, (London, 1990). 
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The closeness of the correspondents to their subject is an important factor for understanding 
how the journalistic principles of impartiality and objectivity were corrupted during the 
Falklands campaign. Reflecting upon how his outlook changed, Robert Fox said that at the 
beginning of crisis he saw himself as an independent actor. However, because he was sharing 
in the fear and exhilaration of the fighting with the soldiers, he noticed that his attitude 
changed. His description of his reaction to the downing of an Argentine Skyhawk after it was 
hit by machine gunners from 2 Para is revealing ‘We jumped out of the trenches and danced 
like apes, shouting “Yaaaaah” with delight that the attackers have been hit’.24 The atavistic 
elation demonstrated by Fox was matched by moments of great sobriety. Ian Bruce said in no 
uncertain terms that he was ‘Fucking bitter… Bitter because people I know are dead’.25  
It has been said about motivation for fighting that‘…fighting for yourself, your comrades, for 
each other, that sustains you in the moments you think you might be losing.’26 By extension, 
if soldiers fight for their comrades, not for their rulers, then journalistic identification with the 
soldiers does not necessarily mean they supported the British cause. The people the British 
armed forces were fighting were not the ‘enemy’ just because they were from Argentina, but 
because it was the Argentines who were (in general) shooting at them. Likewise with the 
journalists, because they were British journalists with the British army their lives were also 
threatened by the Argentinians and thus cast as the enemy in their reports. The similarities 
between the two sides was described by one British soldier ‘we didn’t regard him as an 
enemy soldier, but as someone unfortunate enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong 
time’.27 Though many the senior naval commanders did little to hide the contempt for the 
journalists, the soldiers gradually warmed to the reporters. This occurred as it became 
                                               
24 Fox, Eyewitness Falklands, p.145. 
25 Morrison, and Tumber, Journalists at War, p.102. 
26M. Bilton and P. Kominsky, Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War (London, 1989), p.229. 
27 V. Bramley, Two Sides of Hell (London, 1994), p.211. 
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apparent that they would not be running away as soon as their lives were threatened, 
correspondent Fox even went as far as to say he would pick up ‘the nearest weapon’ and fire 
it at an advancing enemy if necessary.28  
The reporters came to associate themselves with the British forces because the shared 
experiences of trauma and jubilation, combined with their total reliance upon the military for 
everything, from their protection to their food and transport acted as forces of assimilation. 
They built bonds and fostered camaraderie between journalists and soldiers which caused 
shifts in the copy of the reporters; for example, the Argentinians were labelled negatively as 
‘the enemy’ rather than impartially as ‘the Argentinians’. Partisan language was less 
prevalent from correspondents Brian Hanrahan and Robert Fox; this was because they were 
reporting for the BBC who’s ‘chartered duty, its moral responsibility, and its greatest pride 
[is] to tell that truth’.29 They were under professional obligation to try to remain as impartial 
as possible, whereas most of the other journalist’s decision was a personal choice, ‘some 
reporters consciously [rejected] notions of objectivity’ others chose objectivity due to their 
perception of professionalism.30 Nonetheless, bias towards the British forces did creep in to 
BBC reports, Fox’s dispatch on the liberation of Goose Green slipped from speaking as an 
external observer to one directly involved; his use of the phrases ‘enemy’ and ‘we’ indicated 
to the listener that he was on a side, rather than neutral as he was directed to be: 
The enemy were falling back slowly to prepared positions… Time and again we were 
pinned down by fire from mortars and anti-aircraft guns. I was with the battalion 
                                               
28 Fox, Eyewitness Falklands, p.75. 
29 BBC W/A, ‘M. Howard, Speech, 06 May 1982’. 
30 Mercer, Mungham and Williams, ‘Fog of War, p.12. 
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headquarters, and if we were within ten feet of death shells once, we were there forty 
times.31 
Some reporters were able to resist the cultural influences more than others, however, even 
amongst correspondents from papers inclined to disapprove of militarism there was 
unexpected relationships. Gareth Parry of The Guardian recalled how the officers that he met 
were not like his preconception of them as ‘conservative fools’, but rather they were 
intelligent and professional individuals, some even ‘[confessed] as though they were 
converts…. That they were Guardian readers’.32 Mutual affiliations helped to moderate 
opinions, whilst Parry wrote critically of the conflict he still managed to praise both the 
British and Argentine forces; 
…the lethal accuracy of the task force missile ships was spectacular. Crewmen around 
us paid tribute to the courage of the Argentinian pilots. They also deserved credit for 
their own bravery, both those exposed and manning the ships defences and the many 
others, marines and sailors, crouched and waiting in the vessel.33  
Some reporters became too “native”; Tony Snow of The Sun, misunderstood how the military 
thought. He assumed that because the armed forces were designed to use force to compel 
others to do as they wished, that it meant that the forces took a perverse pleasure in doing so. 
Hence his decision to ‘Sponsor a Sidewinder’ which led to requests for more copies of the 
Sun as they were ‘urgently needed for lavatory paper’.34 
The connection the reporters felt was not simply down to being stuck with the army; defence 
correspondents are regularly at the mercy of the military that they are escorted by. Famous 
                                               
31 [Underlining my emphasis]. B. Hanrahan, and R. Fox, ‘I counted them all out and I counted them all back’: 
The Battle for the Falklands (London, 1982), p.44.  
32 Mercer, Mungham and Williams, Fog of War, p.111. 
33 G. Parry, ‘Crewmen applaud bravery of pilot enemy’, The Guardian, 25 May 1982.  
34 Morrison and Tumber, Journalists at War, p.35. 
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BBC reporter Kate Adie maintained an impartial tone throughout her career yet titled her 
Autobiography The Kindness of Strangers in gratitude to those who had helped her and in 
some cases even saved her life.35  
A point of difference highlighted by several correspondents was that the wounded men were 
not foreign, they were British. Veteran of several particularly bloody conflicts, soundman 
John Martin, summarised it by contrasting how he felt different dealing with ‘an absolutely 
horrendous massacre in Uganda’ that he did ‘with no feeling’ because it was ‘not your 
problem’ but that with the Falklands things were different as it was ‘people you’re involved 
with’.36 This attitude is not necessarily xenophobic, but instead can be elicited by a sense of 
shared connection through the nation state. The soldiers may have seemed more familiar 
because it was possible to pick out certain British idiosyncrasies, unlike in Uganda the 
maimed soldier could have lived just down the street and drank a cup of tea with the 
correspondent.37 This could create a form of connectedness derived not just from personality 
and circumstance, but also because they shared a specific connection or represented 
something familiar.  
There were many occasions when the war was very real for the correspondents, they were not 
just observers, but participants. Most of the correspondents were not veterans of several 
conflicts, so the sights of horrific injuries was something new. Seeing the headless corpse of 
an Argentinian conscript,38 or helping wounded soldiers39 back on to land after the attacks on 
the ships Sir Galahad and Sheffield, some of whom whose uniform had fused with their skin 
because of the sheer intensity of the heat from the fires on board their ship, were very 
                                               
35 K. Adie, The Kindness of Strangers, (London, 2003). 
36 Morrison and Tumber, Journalists at War, p102. 
37 See Image 2 
38 See Image 3 
39 See Image 4 
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distressing for the correspondents.40 The fragility of human life became very apparent. The 
guns and the bombs were no longer objects, but weapons that could kill. Remaining detached 
from events became much harder for the correspondents after witnessing such things.  
The association with the British armed forces, combined with a misled belief that they had a 
duty to be more sensitive because it was a British, not foreign, conflict meant that the content 
was more moderate than what more seasoned war correspondents may have produced. 
Perhaps if more reporters of Nicholson’s experience had sailed with the Task Force there may 
have been more concessions from the military due greater resistance to the restrictions on 
what they could report and when they could transmit their copy. Add to this how more 
seasoned reporters had had to learn how to deal with their emotions in such distressing 
situations, then maybe a slightly more detached and less pro-British (whilst nonetheless still 
more radical) tone may have been the result. As it was, for the majority of the Task Force 
correspondents, Hastings statement that ‘Most of us decided before landing that our role was 
simply to report sympathetically as possible what the British forces are doing…’41 became 
truer after the landing and the shared traumas of the conflict brought them closer to the 
soldiers that they were enduring it with. Through such processes the reporters contribution to 
the understanding of the conflict was limited as much by their own experiences and forms of 
self-censorship as it was by the influence of the Government, the MoD, and their own editors 
back in Britain.  
 
 
 
                                               
40 Nicholson, Measure of Danger, p.192. 
41 Sunday Times Insight Team, The Falklands War, p.213. 
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Chapter Two - Elite Understandings 
 
Mohamed Al Fayed, the owner of Harrods department store in London, called me one 
night in the mid-80s to complain about a story we had run criticizing the way he was 
renovating the house in Paris once occupied by the Duke and Duchess of Windsor. I 
offered him space to put forth his point of view. He demanded a retraction and an 
apology. I refused. He threatened to withdraw all Harrods advertising from Times 
Newspapers. 
“You can’t do that,” I said. 
“Why not?” he asked. “It’s my advertising.” 
“Because as of this moment,” I replied, “you are banned from advertising in The 
Sunday Times.”1 
Andrew Neil, Former Editor of The Times  
It has been suggested that newspapers are disproportionately influenced by the commercial 
interests of their advertisers.2 The quote above illustrates this was not the case, Nick Davies 
has claimed that he has never seen advertisers be able to have much, if any influence over a 
newspapers position.3 The view that a new generation of malign corporations with sinister 
intentions to manipulate the public owning the press does not hold much credence. If history 
shows anything it is actually that the previous owners had more sinister objectives; Lord 
Beaverbrook, owner of the Daily Express stated ‘I run the paper for the purposes of making 
propaganda with no other purpose’.4 
In contrast, the most (in)famous media mogul today and also during the Falklands War, 
Rupert Murdoch, operates based upon what will make him the most money. Neil summarised 
Murdoch’s outlook as ‘He is far more right-wing than is generally thought, but will curb his 
                                               
1 A. Neil, ‘Murdoch And Me’, Vanity Fair, (Dec, 1996), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/1996/12/rupert-murdoch-199612 (Accessed 10 June 2014). 
2 Nick Davies claims this view is particularly favoured by left wing radicals; See, N. Davies, Flat Earth News: 
An Award-winning Reporter Exposes Falsehood, Distortion and Propaganda in the Global Media (London, 
2008), p.14. 
3 Davies, Flat Earth News, p.13. 
4 Ibid., p.16. 
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ideology for commercial reasons’.5 His switch from the Conservatives to Tony Blair’s 
Labour Party for the 1997 General Election is illustrative of money outweighing his politics. 
The same was true of other papers, The Daily Mirror, which during the Falklands War 
situated itself on the opposite side of political spectrum to Murdoch’s The Sun, was primarily 
concerned with selling newspapers; the managing director of the Mirror Group said ‘We 
tried to stand up for the man in the street, but he wasn’t really interested. Now we are about 
entertainment’.6  
The commercial interests of the ownership can be seen as one of the primary influencers 
upon how the editors attempted to present the conflict. Political ideology does influence the 
editors, though this still tends to be related to the commercial aspect because readers tend to 
choose a paper that reflects their own political views.7 Accordingly, a change in stance would 
only be likely if the public mood had changed sufficiently for the move to be economically 
sensible. This chapter will consider how newspapers positions were influenced by factors that 
they believed would be in their commercial interest. It will then look at how the government 
understood the importance and influence of the media in shaping understanding of the war at 
an elite and popular level. 
Editorial opinions 
The consistency of circulation figures indicated that newspapers adopted a certain rhetoric 
that they knew would keep their readers. Statistics collected by David Morrison and Howard 
Tumber indicate that despite maintaining a similar level of readership throughout the 
campaign, dissatisfaction with the position of their newspaper was most prominent amongst 
readers of The Sun.8 This was because the newspaper attracted a large number of working 
                                               
5 A. Neil, ‘Murdoch And Me’, Vanity Fair, (Dec, 1996), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/1996/12/rupert-murdoch-199612 (Accessed 10 June 2014). 
6 Quoted by N. Hiley, Times Literary Supplement, 16 October 1987, p.1149. 
7 M. Temple, The British Press, (Maidenhead, 2008), p.201. 
8 Morrison and Tumber, Journalists at War, p.302. 
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class, Labour supporting readers who were more inclined to oppose the war than 
Conservative supporters. During the conflict The Sun actually lost readers at a rate of 40,000 
a day, in contrast, The Mirror, with its pro-Labour, anti-war stance gained 95,000 readers 
over the same period.9  
If Murdoch regarded his newspapers primarily as a means of making money, why was no 
action taken to win readers back? An explanation can be provided by looking back to Suez, 
1956. The Mirror’s opposition to the Falklands War was a risky gambit. Newspapers who 
opposed the actions of the British during the Suez Crisis suffered heavy losses of readership; 
combined, The Guardian, The Observer, and The Daily Mirror, lost 130,000 because of their 
stance.10 History, in conjunction with Murdoch’s support for the Thatcher government, may 
help to explain the overtly jingoistic tone of The Sun. Once the paper had ‘tied its flag’ to the 
jingo ‘mast’ it would be very hard for it to change without angering both those who supported 
and opposed the war, and please neither. To use an apt cliché, they had made their bed, now 
they had to sleep in it.  
The philosophy of the newspaper guides the production of its content, when journalists are 
operating under extra pressure the true nature of what the editorial staff feel reveals itself. 
Davies has stated ‘if truth is the object and checking is the function, the primary asset of all 
journalists… is time’.11 People instinctively turn to their immediate impressions when there is 
little time to make a decision. During the Falklands War The Sun illustrated this with their 
infamous ‘GOTCHA’ headline after the sinking of the General Belgrano.12 The decision was 
taken by the editor Kelvin Mackenzie, who was working with a skeleton staff with whom he 
had to produce the next day’s entire paper due to a journalist strike.13 It was this pressure that 
                                               
9 Harris, Gotcha, p.55. 
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12 See Image 5 
13 Harris, Gotcha, p. 51. 
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removed the final element of restraint from their bellicose rhetoric and revealed how The Sun 
really understood the war. 
A point to be added is that the number or readers lost were actually a small amount of the 
circulation figures for the Tabloids; their contents were read more for entertainment than for 
information. There was, however, an assumption that readers were excited by the idea of a 
shooting war, Daily Mail headlines such as ‘NO SURRENDER’14 and ‘HAIG DOUBLE 
FAULTS’ from the Express,15 demonstrate that amongst the Tabloids, barring the Mirror, 
there was barely any attempt to hide their belligerent warmongering behind ‘the veil of 
national pride’.16 Consequently, commercial interests and politics were enmeshed with the 
need to entertain and influence. This led the editors of the Tabloids to understand their role as 
much about pressing an agenda in an entertaining format, over being informative. Their 
objective was to entertain and influence, not simply to inform. 
With television becoming the primary medium through which the public sought to be 
informed, broadsheet newspapers faced their own challenges in trying to make a profit.17 
Within the government one memory that came readily to the fore was Vietnam and the 
mistaken belief that the media were responsible for the American defeat to the communist 
North Vietnam.18 It is important to remember that in historical context the Falklands War 
happened only seven years after the fall of Saigon. As David Welch and Mark Connelly have 
emphasised Thatcher was not prepared to ‘lose the Falklands on TV’.19 The fear in 
government was that they could very easily have fallen had there not been a sufficiently 
decisive response to Argentina's seizure of the Islands. With their over focus on opinion polls 
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the government were right to be worried; a Gallup poll published in the Sunday Telegraph 20 
asked: 'The Government have been criticised for being caught off-guard by the Argentinian 
invasion of the Falklands. Do you think this criticism is justified or not?' 78% thought the 
criticism was justified (including 74% of Conservative supporters, 77% of Labour supporters, 
82% of Liberal supporters and 86% of SDP supporters), compared to 14% who thought it was 
not justified and 8% did not have a view.21 These results were included in the weekly polling 
summaries that were the primary source Thatcher used to gauge public opinion, and thus help 
explain why she was ‘keen to project resolution and an appropriate degree of moral 
outrage’.22 
Although TV had overtaken the broadsheets, they were still major influencers as they were 
the sources that the higher echelons of power were likely to read.23 The resignation of 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, at the beginning of the conflict gave the government an 
early warning of the power of the media, and in particular the broadsheets, to have influence 
on the government. Thatcher noted how Lord Carrington was pressurised to resign after he 
had seen ‘Monday’s press… in particular the Times leader’.24 Lord Carrington emphasised 
how there had been ‘strong criticism of Government policy in Parliament and in the press’. A 
lot of which he felt had been ‘unfounded’, but nonetheless he took responsibility and thought 
that it was ‘right that [he] should have resigned’25 
Seeing Lord Carrington forced out of his job by the media had a major effect on MPs as it 
reminded them of Suez and the end of Anthony Eden as Prime Minister. Suez had a profound 
                                               
20 ‘Gallup Opinion Poll’, Sunday Telegraph, 18 April 1982. 
21 CAC: THCR 2/11/9/34 f66, Opinion Polls: Britto note ("Public Opinion Background Note 109") [weekly 
survey note; Falklands crisis], 19 April 1982. 
22 Personal Correspondence with Professor Kevin Foster. 
23 M. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, (London, 1993), p.186; See also M. Temple, The British Press, 
(Maidenhead, 2008), p.208. 
24 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p.186. 
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effect upon Defence Secretary Sir John Nott, a point emphasised numerous times in his 
memoirs.26 When reflecting on the conflict he noted that memories of Suez ‘haunted many of 
his colleagues’,27 a view supported by fellow War Cabinet member Willie Whitelaw who 
feared the war could turn in to a similar media debacle and said that he was ‘lying awake at 
night with visions of Suez’.28 
Tony Shaw’s revisionist analysis of Eden’s media management during the Suez crisis, 1956, 
demonstrates the difficulty in trying to draw lessons from history. Eden controlled the media 
with a greater level of sophistication than initially thought.29 Though unlike Thatcher, Eden’s 
strategy failed, and with it his tenure in government ended. This happened twenty years 
before the blame for the American defeat in Vietnam was attributed to the media. Shaw 
remarked that ‘Suez taught future governments – like Margaret Thatcher’s during the 1982 
Falklands conflict – about the values and methods of successful propaganda in wartime’.30 
The controls and restrictions placed upon the media during the conflict can be linked to a 
sense of paranoia that the media could cause a collapse in public support for both the war and 
the government. 
The role of Suez in influencing government policy can be seen from the two lessons Nott 
took from the conflict: ‘The need to avoid divisions at the top in Whitehall and the necessity 
of carrying outside opinion’. 31 International support was very important to the British 
government; throughout her memoirs Thatcher continually related events in the Falklands to 
their influence on what was happening with the Americans. With regards to the influence this 
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had on the media the minutes from a meeting for the Information Group on the Falklands, 
chaired by Bernard Ingham, emphasised that there was a ‘danger of losing domestic and 
international support for policies if we failed to present our actions in a coherent and 
authoritative manner’.32 Consequently, the aim was to get firmly based information out in the 
‘most helpful context’.33 This phrase is key, context is what gives a message meaning; for 
example, on the domestic front the government sought to mitigate the bad news of the attack 
on HMS Sir Galahad by making the media give the ‘good’ news that Argentine planes had 
been shot down first.34  
A consequence of the broadsheets being regarded as an influencer of opinion was that it drew 
the attention of the government, who at times tried to exert direct editorial influence over 
them. Minutes from a Chiefs of Staff meeting show that there were attempts to encourage 
‘one or two authoritative newspapers… to include within their coverage an article 
highlighting the need for discretion and responsibility in the reporting of an operation in 
which men’s lives could be at risk’.35 The belief that it was necessary to ‘encourage’ 
newspapers is indicative of the difference between the media and the government. It was in 
part caused by newspapers ignoring D- Notices advising them on what they could publish, for 
example The Daily Mail ignored D-Notice number six in its discussion of the ways in which 
SIGNIT could be used.36 However, the motivation was also driven by a patronising attitude 
towards both the media and the public, who if they opposed the principle of censorship were 
regarded as not understanding its necessity. This was ironic since it highlights the lack of co-
ordination within the government that they should want newspapers to raise the issue of 
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censorship considering that the Task Force correspondents were not even allowed to say they 
were being censored!37  
Furthermore, the encouraging the papers to talk of acting with ‘discretion and responsibility’ 
failed. The Times, a newspaper that supported the war, did carry an article about the role of 
censorship two weeks after it was suggested encouraging them to do so. Yet, it did not take 
the blindly supportive role that it was assumed that it would; instead it said ‘Editorial staff in 
many newspapers and broadcasting organizations are deeply divided and are thus unsure 
what balance to strike between blind patriotism and constructive criticism...’ It continues to 
then critique the fact that ‘The British authorities are practicing censorship and many in the 
media feel a patriotic duty to re-establish the veracity of official communiques’.38 
Memory of the Second World War played an important part in elite perceptions. Michael 
Foot’s support for the Falklands War is interesting; as leader of the Labour party, with strong 
affiliations to peace organizations such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), it 
would be easy to assume that he would have taken an oppositional stance. However, this was 
not the case, Foot’s support for the Falklands War was not a change in position, but rather 
was consistent with opinions he had expressed prior to the war. Foot regarded the conflict as 
a war against a Fascist dictator, a man who should not be appeased. To Foot appeasement 
was a dirty word; as a journalist in 1940 he co-wrote a book called Guilty Men under the 
name Cato. The book blamed the war on poor foreign diplomacy with Germany, culminating 
in a policy of appeasement that left them unprepared for war.39 Foot’s distaste for Fascists 
was shared with his predecessor, the former leader of the Labour party, James Callaghan, 'I'm 
not handing over two thousand eight hundred Britons to a gang of fucking fascists’.40 
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The criticism of appeasement was not confined to the Labour Party, Lord Stoddart 
emphasised that ‘Appeasement never pays’. He pointed to the appeasement of Ian Smith in 
Rhodesia, who he described as ‘every bit as much a Fascist as Galtieri ’stating that ‘It took 15 
years and 22,000 lives to restore the position before Smith seized power’.41 Evidently, 
Britain’s history of decolonisation in the post-war era did not mean that their relationship 
with former colonies was over. During the Falklands War many of these countries sent 
Thatcher letters of support and encouragement, their main concern, a rhetoric that Thatcher 
was to continually re-affirm, was that if Britain did nothing then their own nations would be 
threatened. A letter from Prime Minister Price of Belize stated that they strongly supported 
the ‘principles of self-determination’.42 This is unsurprising since Belize had only gained 
independence a year before in 1981 and feared invasion from their larger neighbour, 
Guatemala.  
From an international perspective, the BBC took the lead in making sure that information was 
presented in the ‘most helpful context’,43 though not necessarily in a manner that pleased the 
Government. The BBC’s ‘reputation for telling the truth… led to Argentina jamming British 
Spanish language broadcasts’.44 As The Daily Mirror stated ‘Truth is always the best 
propaganda’.45 Thatcher criticised the BBC for their position of impartiality, saying that it 
caused ‘great irritation among many people’,46 the reaction from the press did not correlate 
with her statement. Instead they came to the defence of the BBC after Conservative MPs and 
The Sun attacked the corporation over a Panorama episode on opposition to the war.47 There 
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was clearly disagreement about the BBC, but one thing that was agreed was that the BBC 
should not become a mouthpiece for governmental propaganda. 
There was an element of self-protection as newspapers that came out in support of the BBC 
came from both those who opposed and supported the war.48 The widespread support for 
BBC independence was contrasted with Argentine false propaganda which did much to lend 
legitimacy to British claims to be defending their basic democratic rights. As George Howard 
stated this made the BBC ‘a vital engine of this great democracy’.49 
Where the BBC were criticised ITN were praised for their coverage. This is because they had 
more scope for independent comment, without the obligation of impartiality. ITV Editor 
David Nicholas said he would not take part in ‘overt misinformation’,50 this did not mean that 
there was not scope for editorial bias, current guidelines understand that different forms of 
programme will have different purposes and functions, yet the essential facts must remain 
accurate.51 By not having the responsibility of having to be neutral ITV had a broader range 
of positions from which it could tackle challenging issues than the BBC. For this reason 
ITN’s and IRN’s coverage of the war seemed to garner more praise for its coverage. Tam 
Dalyell, one of the strongest and consistent MPs to protest against the war said; ‘as a 
dissenting voice over the Falklands issue, I believe that ITN and IRN were fairer in opening 
their doors to minority and dissenting opinion’.52 There was also an Anti-Falklands war 
demonstration at the BBC Head Quarters because they wished to object to what they saw as 
‘bias of excluding views of people who [wanted] an immediate truce, negotiations and to stop 
the war’.53 To look at it another way, if the BBC were angering people on both sides with an 
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apparent bias, then they were arguably doing something right in order to present maintain 
their neutrality. 
One way that the MoD tried to shape the media was through control over the flow of 
information, this led to the criticism from the press for the MoD being ‘stingy with 
information and [seemed] to be under the impression that the media will publish what it says 
and no more’.54 Some have described it in terms of a sort of government conspiracy to keep 
the public in the dark.55 The HCDC made it clear that they did not see it this way, rather they 
attribute the problems primarily to technological and logistical issues.56 A number of 
commentators have also contested that this is a moot point and that strategic deception is 
legitimate according to the principle of military necessity. The Second World War played an 
important part in helping shape this outlook, where strategic deception was used on a scale 
not seen before. Deception became part of British military doctrine, its cultural resonance 
from the Second World War gave some the feeling of legitimacy in thinking that deception of 
both the public and the enemy is acceptable as ‘if wars are to be fought,[they] are there to be 
won’.57 
Another way that government officials sought to control the press was through the Lobby 
system. There have been many criticisms of the Lobby, historians such as Peter Hennessy, 
who was a journalist for the Times in 1982, claimed that for a liberal democracy Thatcher 
used an unacceptable level of manipulation that had ‘not [been] seen before in British 
politics’.58 Valerie Adams suggested that in the Falklands War followed precedents set by 
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previous British governments,59 a view supported by James Margach who showed how lobby 
journalists had been corrupted by their closeness to their sources; they abided by a set of rules 
and willingly operated within a system where conditioned information was provided on the 
MPs terms, inhibiting their capacity to act as independent agents.60 Nott appeared to agree, he 
claimed that rather than helping the war effort, the Lobby meant he had to spend a large 
amount of time correcting untruths spread by ‘disaffected’ MPs.61 Alan Clark believed those 
responsible were ‘determined that the expedition [would] not succeed….’ in order to bring 
about the ‘downfall’ of Thatcher’s government.62  
Ingham understood the historic precedents of the Lobby. His book on the development of the 
relationship between the government and journalists builds upon Margach’s. Strangely, 
Ingham criticised the historical corruption of government-media relations and also of having 
to fight ‘official secretiveness’. 63 His comments raise questions about the motivation of his 
work, admitting himself that he has been described as the original ‘spin doctor’;64 there is an 
element of covering his own back with these assertions. Ingham tried to moderate Margach’s 
criticism of the lobby, arguing that they help to limit press excesses and are a way of 
politicians combating the ‘piranhas of the press, radio and TV…’65  
Within the War Cabinet Foreign Secretary Francis Pym took a similar line; he saw victory as 
the ultimate aim, and that the public’s right to information was secondary to this.66 At a 
conference held to discuss elite views of the conflict John Nott was far more aggressive in his 
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opinion ‘the press are nothing but a pain in the arse! Whatever the circumstances, they will 
do their very utmost to make a military operation almost impossible’.67 
Major-General Sir Jeremy Moore did not blame the Task Force journalists, but that ‘the 
problem tended to arise… with editors back at home’.68 Admiral Sir John (Sandy) Woodward 
was more moderate and self-critical. He spoke about the journalists ‘total ignorance of all 
things military’ blaming this on the fact that ‘we do not take them on operations anything like 
enough as often as we should, nor do we offer them any indoctrination or training.’ He placed 
blame for this not with the media, but that it was a ‘long-term Ministry of Defence failure’.69  
The differences between the Army and the Navy were pronounced; the Army had years of 
experience of operating with the media in Ireland, learning the ‘hard way… that the press is a 
necessary, and often very useful evil’.70 In contrast, the Navy had not seen major active duty 
since Suez. Some officers such as Captain Jeremy Black learnt during the ‘Cod War’ with 
Iceland, the ‘importance of the media’s role in the international propaganda war’.71 Yet his 
outlook was not shared by the majority of the Navy’s staff, whose preference were 
summarised by Michael Nicholson, ‘…they would dearly have liked to sail away from 
Portsmouth, at night, win their war and return as silently, hoping no one had noticed they had 
been away’.72  
The media were low on the Navy’s priorities, whose focus was on the direct military 
operation ahead. The lack of interest in the value of PR revealed itself in systemic flaws 
within the structure of the Navy; jobs as a media officer were regarded as inferior and 
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therefore did not attract the most able recruits. Consequently there were only thirty-one Navy 
PROs.73  
The flaws in the Navy were exacerbated by a lack of co-ordinated information policy, with 
the MoD sending confused and contradictory messages. For example when speaking about 
the BBC broadcasting the attack on Goose Green prior to its actual occurrence Admiral 
Woodward believed ‘some clown’ at the MoD had told them. 74 His comments also help to 
illuminate the sense of confusion that he felt with the censorship system; ‘we did hope that 
someone, somewhere, would have the common sense to put a censoring delay on release of 
this kind of information’.75 His view was common, one Marine Officer said 
…there was almost daily changing of the ground rules. Some days your were allowed 
to talk about certain things, and other days you were not… a policy should be laid 
down in black and white so that everybody knows what it is.76 
The inclination of the government to try shape the media was the product of a certain reading 
of history, particularly the Second World War, Suez and Vietnam. It suggests that Thatcher 
may have tried to paint a picture of a united Britain, yet in reality she and her cabinet feared 
that public opinion was more fragile and dependent upon what they read, watched and heard 
from the media than she wished to let on. It was telling of how heavy the influence of events 
such as Suez loomed over the government that Senior Civil Servant, Bernard Ingham, related 
his own predicament during the Falklands War to that of Douglas Clark, Eden’s Press 
Secretary who resigned in protest during the Suez Crisis. Ingham claimed that he would have 
resigned because he had been ‘left in ignorance’ and was therefore not able to ‘do his job 
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properly’, but that unlike Clark did not because there ‘had been a war on’.77 Ingham 
understood the value of his role during the conflict, especially that of tying policy to its 
presentation.78 
The attempts of the government to manipulate the press generally ended in failure, with 
newspapers that even supported the conflict resisting the challenges to their editorial 
independence. The systemic failures that led to the incoherence of the information policy may 
have helped the media; Peter Preston of The Guardian stated: 
Centralized, co-ordinated information is more a feature of autocracies and it is 
certainly not in the interests of the press… you talk to all different sources, not only in 
Britain but crucially in America. It was helpful to have the Foreign Office, MoD and 
Bernard Ingham all uncoordinated because you could compare sources. It is in any 
case daft to think that anyone has got a monopoly of information.79 
There were sharp divergences between the government and its fear of the power of the media 
and the media’s sympathies towards these fears, with most newspapers generally refusing to 
simply be mouthpieces for governmental propaganda. Those who did adopt a jingoistic tone 
did so more because they saw it as the economically sound choice, based upon their own 
reading of history and not because an owner, a wealthy advertiser or the government forced 
them to. 
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Chapter Three - Popular Understandings 
 
The coverage by the popular press was disgusting. And time and time again, as I 
listened to the Government’s propaganda – yes, propaganda – I felt incensed that 
they could think that we were all so stupid.1 
Female Mass Observation Correspondent 
The image of a unified Britain regaining its confidence after economic decline masks the 
reality of a population that did not think in the simple binaries of ‘goodies’ and ‘baddies’ that 
elites assumed that they did. As the above quote shows, people were capable of critical 
thought that recognized propaganda from a variety of mediums. The reliance of the elites on 
quantitative statistics inhibited their ability to fully distil the complexity and conditional 
nature of public opinion. A consequence of this narrow impression of public opinion was that 
with victory, history validated the decisions made, and mistakes and misunderstandings were 
marginalised. This meant the war drum beating by parts of the popular press and the 
government’s control of the media became justified by British triumph. Consequently, in the 
ensuing years the techniques learned for dealing with the media during the Falklands War 
were utilised by the United States of America during their military operations in places such 
as Grenada.2 This was a false correlation that imagined that the public could be categorised 
by their opinions and that their views were readily malleable and absolute. The reality is that 
people can and do think in different and often contradictory ways that do not fit neatly in to 
categories that quantitative techniques create.3 Accordingly, this chapter will show that 
popular views on the Falklands War did not fit neatly in to a narrative of national unity, rather 
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members of the public had concerns about the war which were not necessarily reflected in 
opinion polls. 
This chapter will begin by looking at how the public understood the media before proceeding 
to consider how the media and personal experiences interacted to influence individual views 
of the conflict.  
According to Noam Chomsky media power is held by the producers of the content;4 this 
thesis does not agree with such a view. Instead it subscribes to Paddy Scannell’s argument 
that, ‘power… rests more with those on the receiving end rather than with those who produce 
what is on offer’.5  This is because it does not adopt a deterministic outlook that regards 
individuals as easily manipulated. Instead Scannell highlights the capacity of the individual to 
choose what to watch, read, and listen based on their own personal preferences and 
circumstances.  
Furthermore, viewing, listening and reading habits can shape audience perception. Ludmilla 
Jordanova noted that what constitutes an audience is ‘context dependent’,6 how a person 
reads the newspaper, listens to the radio, or watches the TV can be influenced by many things 
such as; the design of their house, how busy their day is, to other activities they may be doing 
at the same time. For example, a number correspondents stated that they did not just sit and 
watch TV but had to do something else, knitting was one such popular pastime.7  This 
suggests that some viewers dipped in and out of watching the TV. No two people watched the 
TV in the same way; whereas some dipped in and out of watching others described how the 
followed the news with great interest; 
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Falklands news like a serial. 10 p.m. viewing compulsive. Despite the crucial run-up 
to exams I always made a point of joining my husband for a drink in front of the TV 
at this time…8 
Such factors make the media a poor ‘register of the diversity of public opinion’9 and mean it 
is difficult to study the influence of the media purely through content analysis. A useful way 
to help see how the public utilised information presented to them is through an assessment of 
levels of trust in different institutions and groups.  
A year after the Falklands War Ipsos MORI asked the public whether they trusted certain 
groups of people to tell them the truth, Journalists were rated one of the least trusted, with 
only 19% of people believing that they are truthful and 73% believing that they were likely to 
lie to them.10 In contrast, with 63%, people were three times more likely to trust TV news 
reporters to tell the truth and three times less likely to think that they would lie. These results 
are supported by a BBC opinion poll conducted during the conflict that asked members of the 
public what sources they used in order to ‘find out what’s happening in the Falklands’.11 BBC 
TV came top, with 89% claiming to use it, ITV second with 79%, BBC Radio had twice as 
many listeners as commercial radio stations, with 54% for the former and 24% the latter. Of 
the pollsters 74% said that they had used Newspapers to find out what was going on. 
However, when asked which gave the best coverage, Newspapers, with 17%, fell well behind 
the both BBC, 39%, and ITV, 30%.  
The scepticism of the public did not stop people from using newspapers for information, what 
the results suggest is that people read them with a critical eye and did not simply believe what 
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they were told. It has been suggested that trust is an ‘active category… it is something that we 
decide to do’.12 Even amongst those who had to trust the newspapers for their information 
there was still cynicism towards what they read; one correspondent who noted that, 
I too know only what I read in the papers which is obviously a biased opion [sic] of a 
perticular [sic] news man edited by a biased editor; as you can gather I don’t realy 
[sic] believe what I read in papers, but they are my only source of information.13 
Correspondents emphasised their cynicism at what they saw as blatant attempts at 
manipulation. One correspondent described the popular press as ‘disgusting’14 she continued; 
‘…time and time again, as I listened to the Government’s propaganda – yes, propaganda – I 
felt incensed that they could think that we were all so stupid’.15  
A case that gives a clear illustration of popular understanding of the media was when tensions 
in the media came to a head with the BBC’s controversial Panorama episode on opposition 
to the war. 16  The reaction from the political classes was aggressive, however, not all the 
public saw the issue in the same light. Letters to The Times show that despite the newspaper 
supporting the war, its readers did not blindly follow its position. Whilst some people did 
‘Dare Call it Treason’17 many members of the public took a more moderate tone. One letter 
criticized MPs such as John Page who was quoted as saying that ‘we expected the BBC to be 
on our side’. The letter contended that the BBC was only on their side in the ‘sense that they 
are an independent assessment of the news’. The letter emphasized the authors historical 
memory, it argued for the BBC to keep the public ‘genuinely informed’ rather than returning 
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to the ‘naive and patronizing jingoism of the Second World War newsreels…’18 Letters such 
as this highlight how parts of the public understood that this was not an existential battle for 
the nations survival, but was as Thatcher said herself, to preserve the British principle of 
people to ‘choose their own way of life and to determine their own allegiance.’19  
The hypocrisy of the attacks on the freedom of the BBC whilst claiming to be fighting for 
those same principles on the Falklands was not lost on the public or the media, former 
Guardian editor Alistair Hetherington stated ‘…if the BBC were to allow Government 
pressure to weaken its editorial judgments… in the long run, no good would be done to the 
British cause.’20 This is supported by polls conducted for the BBC which show that 81% of 
viewers and listeners felt that the BBC ‘acted responsibly in its TV and radio coverage’, with 
the same number also asserting that the BBC should continue to ‘reflect the full range of 
opinions in its programs.’21  
Mass Observation correspondent’s revealed a sophisticated understanding of how the media 
functioned in Britain. One, a journalist who trained with Gareth Parry, The Guardian 
newspaper reporter with the Task Force, spoke at length about a number of technical and 
stylistic elements to the newspaper reportage. She saw newspapers in the context of a 
reflective rather than domination model, whereby ‘Not everyone would admit it, but there is a 
strong tendency to take a daily newspaper that agrees with one’s political views’.22 She 
labelled people by the newspaper they read, after speaking to one woman who staunchly 
supported the war she ‘[wondered] which newspaper she’s been reading and [speculated] on 
the Express’.23 This leads to an interesting point on how newspapers help shape identity; 
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despite her opposition to the war causing her to feel a sense of alienation, she felt part of a 
wider ‘imagined community’24  because of the shared connection that The Guardian 
newspaper provided: ‘I thanked god for The Guardian, there were other people who felt the 
same way as my husband and myself’.25  
Of those correspondents who supported the war there was still criticism for how the media 
were managed; 
“Experts” were asked to predict, project, criticize, ad nauseam. If this, if that, if the 
other – as if any of their views would make one tiny bit of difference. Oh for the days 
of factual, straight news broadcasts lasting ten minutes and read by Frank Phillips or 
Alvar Diddel.26 
Speculation can be seen from all mediums, though The Sun took it further, presenting 
operational decisions like they were part of a video game, using computer edited graphics and 
hyperbolic language.27 Whilst the journalists at home were described as making a ‘hash’ of 
things, ‘those who went out with the Task force, against the Royal Navy’s wishes, did a 
magnificent job.’ Particular praise was given to Max Hastings of the Evening Standard, 
whose work one correspondent believed ‘really hit a peak of descriptive writing, without 
lurching over into purple prose or tear-jerking… [and] would like to see him win a “journalist 
of the year” award’.28 The public wanted accuracy and honesty, not belligerent propaganda. 
This may explain why Hastings, was the most successful journalists to have sailed with the 
Task Force; that year he did win the award for journalist of the year because his reporting 
was accurate, pro-British, and he wrote pieces on his general surrounding that meant his work 
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was more widely published and read, rather than specific news that would be out of date by 
the time it got back to the UK.  
Influence of media  
The supply and presentation of information from the media influences attitudes, it is through 
such mediums that issues enter in to the public sphere which is what sparks reaction, debate 
and helps to form opinions amongst the population. Censorship is a device used by 
authorities to maintain a power/knowledge dynamic; the suppression of news limits the range 
of opinions that can be held. Evidence of how public thought was constrained can be seen 
through a range of comments.  
With echoes of Chamberlain’s remarks on the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia as the 
problems of ’a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing’29 some people 
felt an element of fantasy to the Falklands War. This sense of detachment was partly due to 
the physical distance, ‘it all seemed so remote, as if anywhere which takes a fortnight or 
more’s voyage is on another planet’,30 but also because of the censorship ‘We still feel we are 
not being told the truth, everything seems too easy for us. It is more like listening to a fairy 
story.’31  
The desire for accuracy is seen in one correspondent who stated that ‘If there has been a 
disaster I tend to turn to BBC Radio 4, my normal source of news anyway, because it tends to 
be the most unemotionally factual, with the possible exception of the World Service’.32 This 
seems to run against Radio theory, which seeks to ‘record the wars images with a tape-
recorder.’33 The want of unemotional factuality may explain the correspondent’s 
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desensitization to violence, ‘as with Northern Ireland, the deaths became progressively less 
shocking’.34  
Not all correspondents had become desensitized to violence; for some the media coverage 
made the war seem very real. One person who initially said that the British were right to go 
and fight described how ‘I do have to leave the room if reporting on an accident or a shooting 
is too specific’.35 Interestingly in the latter parts of her Falklands diary she appears to shift to 
a more reflective tone, she described her how ‘I would be very sorry if in a few years we find 
ourselves giving up sovereignty, it would make the sacrifices men and families have made 
seem very futile’.36 Another correspondent who was sensitive to deaths on both sides felt that 
‘The Sun and The Daily Mail takes a very frivolous view of death. The battleship with over 
1,000 young men going down in in the icy Arctic and headlines like “Up your Junta”. It is not 
funny!’37 Both correspondents’ views were tempered by the sense of reality they felt upon 
learning of casualties, which was partly shaped by how they were presented within the media. 
An expression of the way that the belligerent language of the tabloids pervaded public 
discourse was noted by one correspondent who saw some graffiti that said ‘KILL ALL 
ARGIES’.38 This sort of aggressive jingoism was in tune with newspapers such as The Sun 
and The Express, with headlines such as ‘STICK IT UP YOUR JUNTA!’ and the infamous 
‘GOTCHA!.39 Ironically the graffiti was almost the exact same words that had been used in a 
spoof article by satirical magazine Private Eye, ‘KILL AN ARGIE AND WIN A METRO’.40 
This shows that although some were influenced by The Sun’s tone, there was also significant 
                                               
34 M/O, W633, ‘1982 Falklands War Directive Response’.  
35 M/O, C108, ‘1989 Spring Disasters Directive Response’. 
36 M/O, C108, ‘1982 Falklands War Directive Response’. 
37 M/O, S496, ‘1982 Falklands War Directive Response’. 
38 M/O, G226 ‘1982 Falklands War Directive Response’. 
39 See Images 5 and 10 
40 ‘Kill and Argie and win a Metro’, Private Eye, issue 535, 18 June 1982. 
40 
 
opposition, from both the public and other papers such as Private Eye, and also famously 
from the Daily Mirror, which described The Sun as the ‘Harlot of Fleet Street’.41 
Although people were cynical of what they saw as propaganda the media still influenced the 
way people thought and acted. One instance where the media had a clear and direct influence 
over the public was how The Sun’s anti-Argentine rhetoric led to members of the public 
shopping politically. The Sun ran a campaign that ‘[urged] every housewife NOT to buy 
corned beef produced in the Argentine’.42 A number of correspondents mentioned how they 
refused to buy Argentinian beef, or noticed it had been removed from shop shelves. This was 
a familiar form of protest, with members of the public having boycotted South African 
produce in opposition to Apartheid. Peoples anger did not stop with Argentina, ‘attitudes 
towards the French and Irish were decidedly cool’,  one middle aged couple cancelled a 
holiday to Italy because they believed the Italians were being too sympathetic to Argentina, 
whilst others returned home from holidays in Spain for the same reason.43 As ill feeling 
towards certain nations grew there was also a shift in attitudes that saw an increase in support 
for the EEC. The help that was provided by EEC nations such as France (who provided 
technical information on the most feared weapon in the Argentine arsenal, the French made 
Exocet), helped re-frame it as an institution that could foster co-operation rather than an 
opaque and foreign organization to be distrusted. An expression of this attitude was that, Lord 
Hitchingbrooke, one of the leading Anti-marketeers of the day, dropped his opposition to 
EEC membership because of the support given by member states during the war.44 
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Personal experience  
The relationship of public attitudes towards the Falklands War and the EEC goes deeper; the 
Falklands reignited the memory of the Second World War within public discourse. The 
horrors that were evoked by memory of the Second World War forced people in to thinking 
about how to end such violence. Nicholas Crowson remarked that as recently as 1973-5 there 
had been attempts to convince the post-war generation that joining the EEC was a way of 
limiting the possibility of war as it would rid European nations of their hatred for one 
another.45 
The propensity of the post-war generation towards the EEC as an institution for bringing 
peace is reflected in the quantitative research conducted by Morrison and Tumber. Their 
work has suggested a correlation between age and support for military action; they asked 
‘Did you think at the time of the (invasion) that the situation could be solved by diplomatic 
means alone with no fighting or did you think it could only be solved by fighting?’ Their 
results indicate that support for fighting increased from 30% in the 18-24 age group, up to 
51% for the 65 plus age group, whilst the results were inverse for support for diplomacy 
alone. Gender also had a similar correlation, 57% of women regarded diplomacy as the best 
way to solve the situation, compared to 49% of males. 46  
Lucy Noakes has argued that public understanding of the Falklands War was structured by a 
gendered memory of the Second World War. She contended that females had a greater range 
of positions from which to view the Falklands War. She believed both men and women used 
their personal memories of the Second World War ‘in order to make sense of their own 
thoughts and feelings’.47 However, women appeared more likely than men to draw upon 
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memories which did not ‘“fit” in with the dominant public memories being expressed in the 
press and in parliament…’48  
One opponent of the Falklands War, a female correspondent, offered an indication of how 
gender and memory of the Second World War influenced her response to the sinking of the 
General Belgrano. ‘In the last war I believed the only “good German was a dead one” I know 
now that was wrong and feel no hatred for the Argentinians, in fact I feel sad that they also 
have lost so much.’49 This retrospective critique of her own views highlights how loyalty to 
the ‘British’ cause can be more conditional and discriminating than what opinion polls 
revealed to the elites. Her response shows how she shifted from an outlook situated within the 
traditional memory of the Second World War, with the Germans firmly placed as the evil 
enemy, to one where enemy has taken on a human face. She related her personal experiences 
of loss to those that she thought the Argentine enemy must also have been experiencing.   
The same correspondent also illustrated how men used their personal experiences of conflict 
to support the Falklands War. She spends some time writing of her husband’s support for the 
sinking of the Argentine ship, the General Belgrano. His justification is based on military 
necessity, ‘When the Argentine battleship was sunk, my husband who served on HMS 
Jamaica in the last war said “if this is war you sink the lot for your own safety…”’50 This 
strikes a very different tone to her own position, whilst her husband thought in terms of the 
broader military context framed within his own memory of the Second World War, her view 
was based on the emotional consequences of the use of force. 
One male correspondent, claiming to be of a socialist persuasion, explained how his memory 
of the Second World War helped guide his opinion. When discussing generational differences 
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he noted how ‘the only bodies children see today are either make-believe or violent death 
victims on TV’.51 His point is emphasized by his hard attitude in towards the loss of life 
during the Falklands War, which he related back to the Second World War: 
The Falklands War was regarded by many as a disaster… yet the total British death 
toll was 365, exactly the same as the civilian death toll in the Metropolitan Police 
District, on what was accepted as the first night of the blitz. To those directly involved 
there were 365 tiny little disasters, collectively it was just a little bit of the war, 
0.00076% of the population...52 
Whereas this male correspondent used the memory of the Second World War to make the 
Falklands War seem proportionally insignificant, female correspondents appeared to use their 
memories to express their fears of escalation and more destruction. In contrast to the 
hardened attitude of the male correspondent, one woman identified her age as a major 
determining factor, she said that having been ‘born after the Second World War, [she had] no 
vision of what it will be like if the major countries get involved.’53  
A different female felt that in her area gender seemed to be a stronger determinant of opinion 
than age; ‘young men seemed to think it was jolly fun’, but older people such as herself did 
not like what was happening as they had ‘terrible memories of the “last war”’ (meaning the 
Second World War).54 Her remarks run against the general conclusions of Morrison and 
Tumber and so raise questions of what other factors shape opinion. In this case it appears that 
geography may have played an important part. The correspondent lived close to Plymouth, 
home to the Navy’s largest base, Devonport, so many of the young men she would have been 
in proximity to would have some relationship to the armed forces, either as members of Navy 
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or as workers contracted to work on the base. As a result, their views may have been coloured 
by their association to the military. 
The cynical attitude of the correspondent was inherited by her daughter, who noticed how 
after the ITV news there were adverts normally only seen before Christmas for the toy 
soldier, Action Man. She questioned the attempt to re-enforce such gendered roles through 
the sarcastic comment ‘they should advertise nurses outfits for little girls’.55 This daughter 
shows that people are capable of not blindly accept the messages targeted at them but can 
resist attempts to influence them.  
It has been argued that another important impact upon a person’s opinion is their family. 
Thatcher had an idealised and essentially fictional vision of Victorian familial values; her 
attitude towards the family can be seen from a now famous quote 'There is no such thing as 
society; there are only individuals, and families’.56 This implies that she believed that one of 
the primary structuring forces within the nation state was the family with it operating as a 
naturally formed cohesive unit with its own rules, regulations and reprimands. 
One form of propaganda mobilized during the conflict was the Royal family, who assumed 
their traditional role as a symbol of ‘national/familial unity’.57 Each member’s role was 
dictated by their gender and position within the family; the Queen came to represent the 
mother waiting for her son to return home, headlines such as ‘I HUNT THE ENEMY WITH 
ANDY’58 show how her son, Prince Andrew, a helicopter pilot with the Task Force, slotted in 
to the symbolic character of the warrior prince.59  
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What becomes apparent is that family and representations of it played an important part in 
helping to shape public perception. The use of readily understood symbols by the Royal 
Family helped clarify the protagonist each member in society was expected to play. Kevin 
Foster has expanded on this, he identified how both the Falklands and Second World War, 
‘focused on a shared vision of the family as a symbol of the nation’.60 
However, Thatcher’s understanding of the family does not seem to be reflected by all the 
Mass Observation correspondents; for example, there does not seem to be a relationship 
between close family ties and support for the war. Not all Britons were members of 
traditional nuclear families, one correspondent who expressed mixed feelings towards the 
Falklands War grew up in foster home because her father was unable to care for her after the 
mother had committed suicide. Having had a sense of detachment from her own family she 
grew up in a home where although she loved her foster parents, the environment was one that 
was ‘constantly warring’.61  In her reports it is possible to see her mixed feelings for the war 
in terms her family and social relationships. Her opposition is expressed in relation to the 
fractured nature of her own family experiences, worrying mainly about the consequence the 
casualties will have on other families: ‘WAR whether small or large is so destructive. 250 
families have been directly affected by the deaths of their loved ones…’62 However, her fear 
for other families was mitigated by her then current social situation; she was living in an area 
near RAF Wattisham and mixed with a lot of RAF families and she consequently emphasized 
the influence they had on her, ‘I felt very proud of our forces – specially [sic] the RAF.’63 
Another female correspondent opposed the war on the basis Argentina was a young country 
and Britain should not have been so heavy handed with them. She struggled to share her 
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opposition to the war as she believed her view was the minority in her family who ‘see 
Britain as the good guys and want a scrap, “go in there and blast them out” being the general 
consensus of opinion’.64 She felt she ‘could not air views in a climate that seemed to have 
unanimous support for the government’s actions.’65 Despite her sense of isolation and 
incapacity to share her opinion her family was not a force for changing her opposition to the 
war.  
The fracturing of opinions within the family did not have much bearing on other member’s 
views. One person who felt she could not share her views with her family was still able to 
hold them,66 another described how her husband vehemently opposed the war on the premise 
that he was a strong socialist, yet despite believing ‘family comes first’67 it did not stop her 
from supporting the conflict.68 
One way that the family influenced opinions was through people contextualizing events 
happening in the war to the effects it could have upon their own families. Major events had 
an influence on how people perceived death; after the sinking of HMS Sheffield one woman 
with a strong sense of familial connection described how her fears had manifested themselves 
in disturbing dreams.  
I dreamt I was carrying a dying soldier in my arms. I was walking along the beach in 
the dark and when a light shone on the soldiers face it was my son. My daughter and I 
also dreamt of soldiers and ourselves drowning.69 
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These dreams helped reinforce her views that despite the war being several thousand miles 
away it was ‘not just something you read of in the papers and watch on TV’.70 The fear of it 
being her son who would die helped confirm her opinion that the war was a ‘nightmare’.71  
She also linked the fear for the safety of her family to criticism of Thatcher’s position, 
‘Thatcher cried when she lost her son, now she is sending others’.72  Similarly, another 
correspondent asked whether Thatcher would have appeared more ‘humane’ if had been her 
son, Mark, who had been killed or injured.73 She described her memory of Thatcher’s 
‘coldness’ towards sending people ‘needlessly to their death’74 
Individual views were not sufficiently reflected in the opinion polls the government relied 
upon. The statistics failed to elucidate the complex range of feelings held, nor did they 
explain the great variety of factors that shaped perception. The roles of personal experience, 
viewing habits and free thought were limited to closed questions that prevented a fuller 
analysis of what people actually thought.  
To many people the war did not seem like a “gung-ho” war movie that elements of the press 
sought to make it appear. People understood that the war was very real, they used their 
memories and experiences to make sense of the conflict, hence people feared for the lives of 
soldiers on both sides. This did not mean that there was no animosity towards the 
Argentinians, but rather that such sentiments did not necessarily equate to wanting to kill 
them. There were times when the media were able to influence the public, such as people 
refusing to buy Argentinian beef. However, this should be put in context, shopping politically 
is a form of peaceful protest that has its roots in the identification of Free Trade as ‘civilizing 
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mission of peace and progress’75 at least as far back as 1904 and had were a tactic used by 
contemporaries in the Anti-Apartheid movement.76  Even though it was an idea from The 
Sun, to think that this meant that people were easily manipulated by newspapers is inaccurate. 
Peaceful protests are actions that any person can support, this does not mean that they support 
the organization that came up with the idea. Individuals are capable of resisting propaganda 
and developing their own opinions that may be influenced by the media but are not dictated 
by them. Public understanding of how the media in Britain operated as well as general 
cynicism towards attempts to influence them meant that reservations about the war were 
nuanced and not reserved solely for those in opposition, but also held by those who supported 
it.  
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Chapter Four- Representations and Memory 
 
Thatcher sits there in her fucking ivory tower and sends us on a fucking phoney war! 
The Falklands? The fucking Falklands? What the fuck’s the Falklands? Fucking 
innocent men, good fucking strong men. Good soldiers losing their lives, going over 
there thinking they’re fighting for a fucking cause. What are they fighting for? What 
are they fighting against? Fucking shepherds!1 
         Combo 
Views like Combo’s were excluded from the early post-war narratives of the conflict, which 
instead portrayed the war as stimulating a national revival; it is a contention of this chapter 
that memory of the Falklands War has over time morphed to enable the expression more 
critical representations of the conflict. An exhibition titled ‘The Falklands Factor: 
Representations of a Conflict’ by the Manchester City Art Galleries presented a critical view 
of the conflict through the use of selected images, cartoons and photographs. One intention of 
the exhibition was to suggest that the Falklands ‘story was “produced”, or “constructed” in 
the media’.2 Co-organiser, Tim Wilcox, suggested that it was ‘a meta-war – you might say it 
never quite happened’,3 though Foster has contended it existed only in ‘strictly defined 
terms’.4 The foundational narratives were principally a product of the media, which as the 
‘first draft of history’5 was the primary source through which the public gained their 
information. In academia the most cited work has been the book written by Task Force 
correspondent, Max Hastings and political editor of The Economist, Simon Jenkins, which 
published in the post-war rush to print offers ‘but a snapshot of partially observed reality’.6  
Neil Smelser argued that during a crisis, political discourse shifts its focus from specific 
issues generally related to economic and political objectives towards the broader and more 
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fundamental level of perceived norms and values of the nation.7 During the Falklands War 
this meant that certain types of memory were employed within the media to help present the 
conflict as based largely upon a retrospective assertion of the parallel values it shared with 
the Second World War. This chapter will demonstrate how the memory of the Falklands is an 
area of contested history by arguing that the presentation of the conflict through any medium 
has been built upon a set of foundational narratives that have themselves been shaped through 
a variety of factors. It will consider how forms of memory mobilised during the Falklands 
War have by both conscious and unconscious processes reflected or sought to dispute these 
formative discourses.  The themes to be considered are; national revival, representations of 
heroism, memories of public opinion, and current media presentation.  
National Revival 
Kevin Foster has claimed that ‘by the mid-90s it had become clear that the war had played an 
important role in shaping the new bombast of Cool Britannia and the national revival’.8 The 
idea of national regeneration was one that Thatcher used in the aftermath of the conflict to 
attack the power of the unions;  
…once again Britain is not prepared to be pushed around. We have ceased to be a 
nation in retreat. We have instead a new-found confidence—born in the economic 
battles at home and tested and found true 8,000 miles away. That confidence comes 
from the re-discovery of ourselves, and grows with the recovery of our self-respect.9 
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Research by the academics such as David Sanders10 have pointed out that the British 
economy was beginning to improve shortly prior to the war, nonetheless, when Argentina 
invaded the Falklands the Thatcher government was at a low ebb: massive rises in 
unemployment (over 13% in April 1982), inflation high, deep cuts in public expenditure and 
social provision had sent the government at that time to the lowest approval rating on 
record.11 Though there were many people who despised Thatcher and her government some 
entirely approved of her response to the crisis; this, then, makes the question of public 
opinion very complex. As members of the public quarantined their responses to the war from 
their more traditional political sentiments, whatever they felt about Thatcher and the 
Conservatives, Argentina's invasion had humiliated the nation and marked a low in the post-
imperial decline. Victory gave people a reason to be proud. 
The notion of a transformation has been adopted by Naomi Klein, who suggested that ‘it was 
the Falklands that gave Thatcher the political cover she needed to bring a program of radical 
capitalist transformation to a Western liberal democracy for the first time’.12  Klein’s 
argument is riddled with presumptions and takes a deterministic outlook that seems to 
obscure other factors in order to try and fit the Falklands War in to her concept of the use of 
shock to instigate radical political reforms. For example her assertion that ‘When news 
arrived that Argentina had laid claim to the Falklands, Thatcher recognized it as a last-ditch 
hope to turn around her political fortunes and immediately went into Churchillian battle 
mode’.13 Was it really last ditch? Although her popularity ratings were lowest on record, 
Thatcher’s fortunes were on the rise prior to the Falklands War, with some theorists arguing 
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that based on forecasts conducted prior to the conflict that Thatcher was likely to have won 
the next election regardless of whether the war had happened.14 Certainly there was an 
element of self-preservation in Thatcher’s decision to send the Task Force to recover the 
Islands; there was a real sense that if they did not act then the government could fall.15   
The jingoism of the tabloid papers and the sententiousness of a number of the broadsheets is 
indicative of how the media made generalizations around which an ‘imagined community’16 
was formed. Such rhetoric highlighted how the media wished to convince the public that the 
conflict was a threat to certain ‘British’ values rather than primarily endangering economic 
and geopolitical interests. Thatcher did use the conflict as a springboard from which to attack 
the unions, who were transformed in to the new ‘enemy within’,17 but it was not a conspiracy 
that from the very beginning was designed to induce ‘shock therapy’.18 There was a sense 
that Thatcher saw the Falklands War as part of a bigger historical narrative about the 
geopolitical role of the United Kingdom and national revival; it did play a significant role in 
her decision to go to war, but it is important to emphasise that it was not the only reason. The 
importance of the democratic rights of the islanders did play part in Thatcher’s calculations.  
The Falklands Soldier 
The 2002 BBC production of Ian Curteis’s The Falklands Play19 contrasts with Klein’s 
argument, the conflict is presented as a morally righteous ‘crusade’ to preserve democratic 
rights lest it lead to attacks on other democratic nations. The pomposity of the victory parade 
sought to glorify the conflict and consolidate it as a positive event in British history, a 
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narrative that Ian Curteis’s The Falklands Play fits within. Curteis’s Manichean portrayal of 
the conflict had clear binaries between good and bad, weak and strong, right and wrong. The 
simplicity of this narrative led to the BBC initially refusing to produce the show in 1983, 
feeling that the moral oppositions were the reason for the ‘laughably poor quality of the 
script’.20 When watching the production after it was finally made in 2002 the absence of any 
criticism of Thatcher is very obvious and it grossly over-simplified both the characters 
involved and also the consequences of the conflict. It valorises Thatcher as a Prime Minister 
in the mould of Churchill and casts men such as Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, as enfeebled 
and weak. Curties’s depiction of Thatcher was consistent with the way she was presented in 
other sources; for several years afterwards Spitting Image had her puppet dressed up as 
Winston Churchill, complete with a cigar.21 
In 1988 the Daily Star attacked the exhibition by the Manchester City Art Galleries for its 
critical perspective on the Falklands War, the newspaper published an editorial that argued 
that it was ‘tainted with needless nonsense. With works that poke fun at our brave lads, 
belittling the blood that was shed’.22 According to the paper the memory of the conflict was 
still raw and the exhibition failed to take account of ‘the widows and the children who still 
grieve for more than 225 British dead’.23 One of the organisers, James Aulich, disagreed; he 
felt that whilst in certain spheres (namely the popular press) it would not be acceptable to 
express such views, but the gallery was a free liberal space in which he could.24 
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Asking when and where it is appropriate to criticise a conflict is an interesting question. 
Disputing certain memories can cause angry backlashes; Conservative MP Geoffrey Dickens 
called for a boycott of the exhibition, describing it as a ‘slur on the memory of brave men like 
Colonel H. Jones VC’.25  Hugh Bicheno’s revisionist analysis of the conflict goes further than 
the Manchester exhibition, he builds upon Spencer Fitz-Gibbon’s critique of Jones and the 
battle of Goose Green,26 by seeking to further dispel what he believed are myths that have 
built up around Jones. His work suggested that whilst Jones’s actions in charging an 
Argentine position during the battle of Goose Green were heroic, his operational and tactical 
planning were ill suited to the battle. Bicheno recognised the difficulty of his work ‘offending 
against the “of the dead speak kindly or not at all” stricture’, but felt it necessary to dispel 
how an ‘act born of enraged frustration’ led to the awarding of a posthumous Victoria Cross 
that immunised from criticism by valorising him with ‘excessive significance’.27 It is not the 
historian’s role to construct or reinforce a specific memory. Evidently a sensitive subject 
must be treated with the level of respect it deserves, but the dispassionate examination of the 
past requires the historian to try to get closer to the truth rather than to further obscure it.  
Representations of British Falkland veterans as heroes has helped to shape certain memories 
of the war, glorifying the sacrifices that the soldiers made for their country. However, at other 
times this has obscured realities, not all returning soldiers came home to the fanfare, flag 
waving and cheering of the victory parades. Those who were wounded did not take part in the 
Victory March in London, and there were no crowds to welcome them home when they came 
off of their ships. A number of correspondents from the Mass Observation noted their 
displeasure at the absence of the wounded; they believed that their presence would have 
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added an important element of sobriety to the event as they would have acted as reminder of 
the actual sacrifices men had made. One retrospective response written seven years after the 
conflict said explicitly ’I will never forget the Victory March where the people with injuries 
were not allowed to take part’.28 They also noted; 
I remember very well the young army lad who suffered burns to the major part of his 
body but mainly face and hands and his coming home to a Welsh Village welcome 
and his struggle to come to terms with the way he looked and presented himself and 
his courage with operation after operation.29 
The ‘young lad’ was Simon Weston, a member of the Welsh Guards who was badly wounded 
in the attack on RFA Sir Galahad, suffering 46% burns to his body. Weston’s path to both 
physical and psychological recovery was long and difficult, having over seventy operations to 
reconstruct his face. In February 2014 Weston was named as the nation's ‘most heroic 
figure’30 for the way that he has recovered from the traumas of his injuries. His story has 
made him a public figure that has come to symbolise the heroic sacrifices that soldiers made 
in the conflict; a subject strikingly absent from the immediate aftermath of the conflict where 
the wounded were not represented at the victory parade.  
Yet Weston’s publicity was only possible because his experience was a story of regeneration; 
hence the shift in the titles of the three documentaries from Simon’s War (1983), to Simon’s 
Peace (1985) and finally Simon’s Triumph (1989).31 Because his story follows a positive path 
it may actually have obscured the memories of those who struggled to cope with the 
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challenges of returning home, whether due to PTSD or finding themselves alienated from a 
nation that they had fought for. There have been several artistic attempts to address these 
issues, the Manchester Exhibition had a poignant display on works by soldiers undertaking 
art therapy as a ‘cathartic act’32 to help cope with their PTSD. The images reveal some telling 
points about how the returning soldiers felt about the status in society and how both they and 
those surrounding them remembered the conflict. One collage used a thick black barbed wire 
to indicate the divide between his life before the conflict, where he was ‘happy, reliable, 
hopeful, caring, responsible, appreciative, ambitious, PROUD’ and after the conflict which 
emphasises how he became ‘moody, quick tempered, unreliable, forgetful, [having] 
depression, and non-understanding’.33 Reviews of the exhibition commented that ’for power 
of expression, the most moving of the exhibits will be collages by Servicemen in post-trauma 
art therapy sessions at the Royal Navy Psychiatric Hospital’.34 Co-organiser Tim Wilcox 
said; 
They [the servicemen] come to it completely open. So not only does the way they are 
made look kind of raw compared to the other stuff, so is the experience, you can’t fail 
to be moved by them. They are the most powerful things in the show because they are 
the most direct things.35 
The rawness of the emotional pain that some felt has been tackled the broader public sphere 
of film and television. Building upon the anti-war films that dealt with the mental distresses 
of returning soldiers from the Vietnam War, films such as Tumbledown and have explored 
the consequences for the wounded soldier and the psychological challenges they face when 
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back in Britain. Richard Eyre’s film Tumbledown is a televisual depiction of Robert 
Lawrence’s book of his experiences during the Falklands War, in which he was seriously 
wounded, losing 43% of his brain and focusses on his subsequent treatment after the war. 
When it was first broadcast the film was watched by 10 million people and caused an outrage 
within the armed forces for its graphic representation of what the fighting was actually like. 
Ian Briggs described how the film ‘shocked the nation’36 as it included incredibly vivid, real 
photographs of Lawrence’s exposed brain after he had been shot. Whilst distressing, the point 
was clear, war is bloody and brutal. The armed forces reaction to the film revealed how 
emotions pertaining to the Falklands remained sensitive, the MoD even threatened to seek an 
injunction against the programme.37  
The film used flashbacks of Lawrence’s memory to present what happened on the Falklands. 
The realism of the memories, sometimes obscure and seemingly random help to express the 
psychological challenges Lawrence was dealing with. One of the most controversial scenes 
was a flashback that showed Lawrence bayonetting and slowly killing and Argentine 
conscript. The film depicts Lawrence as seeming nonchalant about what he did in battle. The 
actor Colin Firth, who played Lawrence in the film, portrayed the character as having an air 
of swagger and arrogance in the tone of his discussion with his friend. However this is done 
in a way that suggests that in reality his arrogant manner is a mask to disguise his mental 
frailties. A point vindicated when he was diagnosed with PTSD in 1995, thirteen years after 
the war and seven after the film was made.38 
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As Weston became proof of the government's care to its soldiers, and later a symbol of the 
path to recovery, Lawrence became the angry counterpoint. The film shows how Lawrence 
became progressively more isolated as support from the government slowly disappeared. It 
highlighted how no one gave him any information on the things such as the pension support 
he would receive, and later his sense of anonymity was reaffirmed when he was sent to an 
Army barracks where no one had his health records nor even knew who he was. This sense of 
isolation is further accentuated by showing how like many other wounded soldiers Lawrence 
was hidden away from the public during the victory celebrations; the film shows Lawrence 
being sat at the back of service of remembrance at St Paul's so that he was out of the way of 
the camera. In his book Lawrence speaks of the privileges he had by having a father who had 
twenty eight years’ experience in the RAF behind him; 
He was always prepared to throw his weight around on my behalf, and did so after I 
came home. He knew the forces system, and the language of the system, and the right 
people he should be contacting to help me at any time. What’s frightening is how 
much I still suffered despite having the sort of father I had, doing all that. It made me 
wonder, if this is happening to me, an officer with a supportive forces family, what 
the hell was happening to the injured guardsman whose father was an out-of-work 
shipbuilder in Glasgow, or an out-of-work miner in Wales.39 
Lawrence has tried find out what happened to his fellow soldiers who fought in the Falklands. 
Through the South Atlantic Medal Association 1982 (SAMA 82) he sought funding from the 
MoD for an assessment of what effect the war had upon veterans; at the time of the article the 
MoD had refused the request. One telling statistic is that ‘during the ensuing 25 years, more 
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Falklands veterans have committed suicide than the 255 that died during hostilities’.40 The 
quote was originally used by the Daily Mail on the twentieth anniversary in 2002, the story 
was prompted by the suicide of Falkland veteran, Charles ‘Nish’ Bruce. The article 
referenced SAMA 82 who believed ‘some 264 veterans have now taken their own lives’. It 
has since filtered in to the wider press and the internet, and has mutated from a conjectured 
statement to being accepted as fact, as demonstrated by the Guardian interview with 
Lawrence. Published in 2014  (seven years after Lawrence had asked for funding) official 
government research in to ‘deaths among UK Armed Forces personnel deployed to the 1982 
Falklands Campaign 1982 -2013’ explicitly contradicts the statistics that originated from the 
Daily Mail article: 
There had been concerns raised that more Falklands veterans had taken their own 
lives since the conflict than died in action. However, the statistics show that 7% of the 
deaths of Falklands veterans since the campaign were attributed to suicide, 
significantly less than the number of deaths during the campaign.41 
When discussing memory of the war Lawrence said pointedly that the long marches across 
the Falklands known as ‘Yomping’ are ‘the only thing that will be remembered’.42 Lawrence 
is alluding to the point that only the challenges that had positive outcomes were to be 
memorialised. Lucy Noakes emphasised how one of the public memorials for the Falklands 
War is a statue of a Yomper, which she asserted represented ‘determination and courage in 
wartime; both of the nation and of the individual’.43 The way that the statue shows the soldier 
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as a masculine figure facing forwards and staring into the distance  is ‘suggestive of many 
First World War memorials, which often consist of the “heroic” soldier figure, transfigured in 
death to represent all the nation’s “glorious fallen” commemorated by the statue’.44 
Tumbledown operates as an oppositional memory of the conflict that seeks to counter the 
heroic narrative of sacrifice and regeneration. 
Race 
One subject that was absent from popular narratives of the Falklands War was the 
contribution of ethnic minority soldiers (barring the Ghurkhas) fighting in the conflict. 
Sapper Pradeep Gandhi was the only Asian Hindu to be killed during the Falklands War, 
some have wondered whether he would be remembered as such. One of his fellow soldiers 
said ‘Goosey, as we called him, would have laughed at this’, in a letter to the Telegraph India 
Don McGillivray said,  
His name, besides being on the main memorial, is also on the Royal Engineers’ 
Memorial on the top of Sapper Hill overlooking Port Stanley. Goosey won’t be 
remembered as an Asian Hindu, he wouldn’t want to be, he will always be 
remembered as a Sapper and a friend.45 
The colour blindness can be considered positive in the sense that it serves them the respect 
paid to every soldier for what they did rather than who they were. Alternatively it can be seen 
as part of a system of exclusion whereby although ethnic minorities made up only about 1% 
of the armed forces,46 the memory of ethnic minority soldiers was absent from the 
foundational narratives. One need look no further back than to the issues around granting 
                                               
44 Noakes, War and the British, p.103. 
45 D. McGillivray, ‘Sapper Remembered’ in ‘Letters to the Editor’, The Telegraph India, 28 April 2007,  
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1070428/asp/opinion/story_7705889.asp (Accessed: 31 June 2014) 
46G. Berman and T. Rutherford, Defence Personnel Statistics, (House of Commons Library, 2013). 
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British Citizenship to Ghurkhas (who coming from Nepal the most famous ethnic groups to 
fight for British Army) to see how memories of minorities struggle to even forcibly enter 
public discourse. Paul Gilroy has suggested that this was because ‘most Britons today 
identify more easily with those of the same stock 8000 miles away… than they do with West 
Indian or Asian immigrants living next door’. Because ‘the national traditions of Deep 
England do not find much room for certain social groups’ and that these traditions 
‘sometimes peter out in the black areas of inner cities’,47 ethnic minority groups may have 
been left out of the ‘imagined communities’ through which the media produced the 
foundational narratives of the Falklands War.  
This point was expressed in Martin Stellamn’s For Queen and Country, in which the central 
protagonist, Reuben, a black Falklands veteran originally from St Lucia, struggles to adjust 
back to life outside of the armed forces. Despite trying to keep himself out of trouble and get 
a job, a combination of his inability to find work and the growing sense of alienation from the 
country that he had fought for, culminating in the revoking of his British citizenship under the 
Nationality Act 1981 (which when it was passed no longer guaranteed citizenship to 
members of the commonwealth),48 drives him to crime. At the end of the film he is killed by 
a police sniper because he had just killed a police officer in revenge as the officer had just 
killed his friend for no reason.  
The officer that Reuben killed was the same one who had confronted him at the beginning of 
the film when he was returning home from the army back to the council estate he had grown 
up on. During the confrontation the officer does not believe that Reuben was a member of 
                                               
47 N. Thrift ‘Images of social change’ in C. Hamnett, L. McDowell and P. Sarre (eds.) Restructuring Britain: 
The Changing Social Structure (London, 1989), p.40.  
48 D. Dixon, ‘Thatcher’s People: The British Nationality Act 1981’, Journal of Law and Society 10:2 (1983) pp. 
161-180; See also Ch. 9 of Randall Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional 
Origins of a Multicultural Nation (Oxford, 2000). 
63 
 
Two Para who fought in the Falklands War. He makes it clear that he thinks Reuben is lying 
by framing the conflict in terms of race; ‘listen pal that was an English War not a jungle 
war’.49 The officer’s perception of a British soldier reflects the portrayal of the soldiers in the 
press. In the same way that Roland Bathes noted how the characters in Joseph Mankiewicz’s 
film Julius Caesar had fringes in order to signify their ‘Roman-ness’,50 the infantry soldiers 
were described as being indistinguishable from each other with their ‘skinhead haircuts’ in 
order to signify their nature as ‘hard men’.51 This form of signification is one that The Sun 
utilised, running stories about soldiers prefixed with them described as ‘With his close-
shaved head, tattoo covered body and heavy bovver boots, he looks every inch what he is – a 
hard man.’52 This image of a Falklands soldier was further established as the atypical form in 
the TV Soap EastEnders where hard man Grant Mitchell plays a Falkland veteran.53 Grant is 
large white male with a shaved head, he and his brother, Phil, are the two tough guys of the 
show. Grants toughness as a soldier is transferred from the Falklands to the east end of 
London, where he is never far from trouble. 
Such representations of the ‘hard man’ was satirised in Steve Barron’s Mike Bassett: England 
Manager,54 which addressed the issue of ‘larger louts… laying waste to European cities in 
the name of football’.55 An issue that Paul Greengrass argued could be traced back to the 
bellicosity by parts of the press who applauded the courage and violence of the British forces 
during the conflict.56 In the film England are faced with Argentina for their World Cup Semi-
Final, during the pre-match build up the TV broadcasters play a video montage that showed 
                                               
49 For Queen and Country (Martin Stellman, 1989). 
50 R. Bathes Mythologies (London, 1993 Edition), p.26. 
51 P. Bishop and J. Witherow, The Winter War: The Falklands (London, 1982), p.59. 
52 Harris, Gotcha, p.36. 
53 B McGuirck, Falklands- Malvinas: An Unfinished business (Seattle, 2007), p.223. 
54 Mike Basset: England Manager (Steve Barron, 2001). 
55 P. Greengrass, ‘Foreword’ in J. Aulich (ed.) Framing the Falklands, Nationhood, culture and identity 
(Buckingham, 1992), p.X. 
56 Ibid. 
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scenes from the British victory in the Falklands. The purpose of this montage is to connect 
the oncoming sporting confrontation with the historic conflict that led to bloodshed in 1982. 
One way that the film mocked the hooliganism and belligerent headlines of the popular press 
was through the depiction of the England Captain, Gary Wackett, who, with his cropped hair 
and broken nose, established himself as the stereotypical English hard man when, with 
echoes of headlines such as ‘STICK IT UP YOUR JUNTA’, he shouts ‘Lets fucking kill ‘em’ 
and punches through the wall before walking out of the changing room.57  
Recent representations 
Recent discussion of the Falklands War has shifted away from the narratives that never 
doubted a British victory. With victory the jingoistic tabloids felt vindicated in their 
confidence and could consolidate their presumptions in to history and obscure how close run 
victory actually was. If newspapers are framed as devices of propaganda, in the sense that 
they function to shape the way people think, then the confident tone can be linked to how 
propaganda operates upon the public. Welch has noted how the great amount of new research 
that contradicts ‘simplistic assumptions’ about the power of propaganda to brainwash the 
masses, describing people as having ‘resistance’ or ‘immunity’ to it.58 He states that ‘in the 
short term propaganda may carry its audience on a wave of fervour… in the longer term it 
becomes less effective, because the audience has had both time and opportunity to question 
its underlying assumptions’.59 
This helps explain why in the aftermath of the conflict Robert Harris’s work gained such 
traction for its accusations against the government of media manipulation. Within the 
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academic field this remained a disputed area, with some agreeing with Harris60 and others 
disagreeing, claiming that there was little or no conspiracy to manipulate the press for 
propagandistic purposes.61 Since Harris’s work public views seem to have erred towards his 
view, with the Guardian running an article describing the conflict as ‘The worst reported war 
since the Crimean’, in reference to how bad news was hidden and information censored.62  
During the conflict the BBC came under attack because they refused to submit to pressure to 
present the conflict from a pro-British angle. In the BBC’s recent coverage this has not 
changed; Peter Snow, who came under particular criticism from Thatcher63 and the parts of 
the public because he would not describe British forces as ‘our forces’64 kept the same neutral 
tone when describing the events of the conflict in the BBC documentary Twentieth Century 
Battlefields.65 Furthermore, the documentary emphasises how close the British came to defeat 
by highlighting the weaknesses of the British Task Force and the potential threats the 
Argentines could use to expose these. Snow highlighted that the greatest worry for the British 
was that a French made Exocet would get through their defences and hit one of the two vital 
aircraft carriers.  
The programme has helped give greater clarity and understanding of the conduct of the 
campaign, for both contemporaries and also for people born after or have no memory of the 
conflict. This is achieved by showing the battlefields through maps and footage of the terrain; 
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another technique was to have co-presenter and son of Peter Snow, Dan Snow, take part in 
simulations of the types of fighting and marches the soldiers experienced during the conflict. 
During the simulations Dan Snow gives a running commentary on the challenges that arose, 
such as the noise and confusion of night time fighting. When it was first broadcast in 2007 
the series had 1.7 million viewers, in taking an 8% share of the viewing figures it represents a 
significant and influential piece of history on the Falklands War.66 This, combined with its 
clarity marks it out as an important work in bringing a greater sense of understanding within 
the British public about the reality of a war that is still an area of contested history. 
Through an examination of representations of the Falklands War it is possible to see how 
despite attempts by elements of the press to corner their version of the war as the main 
narrative, attitudes and memory of the conflict have begun to change. The jingoism and new 
found confidence that later emerged in football hooliganism has faded and critical questions 
such as Rob Wyatt’s song, Shipbuilding, (which although never happened) asked if economic 
revival in the shipbuilding industry because of the war would really have been worth the 
deaths?67 In addition, films have questioned the treatment of returning soldiers whether 
wounded or ostracised from the nation they had fought for because of the colour of their skin.  
These interpretations of the war reflect how British public attitude seems to have cooled 
towards the status of the Islands. Though the British public would still not tolerate an 
Argentine invasion, a recent YouGov poll of British opinions on the Falklands suggested that 
‘37% think the Islands should remain British and 14% would support shared sovereignty, but 
28% think the fairest outcome would be for the Falklands to become independent from both 
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countries’.68 This contrasts with a MORI poll taken at the end of the conflict in which 77% of 
those polled felt that the Falklands should remain British. 69 
Critical representations of the war have become more prevalent since the angry reactions by 
parts of the press to the Manchester Gallery’s exhibition. As seen in the film This is England, 
which in a subversion of traditional representations of opposition to the war only being held 
by left-wing people, a far right-wing skinhead, who does not look too dissimilar to Grant 
Mitchel, asked ‘What the fuck’s the Falklands?’70 Combo’s expletive ridden speech helps to 
show that ‘resistance’ to propaganda is part of everyday life; he represents how people can 
think in unexpected ways and their opinions are not set in stone but are actually more fluid 
and conditional. 
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Conclusion 
 
I had the winter at the back of my mind. The Winter. What will the winter do? The 
wind, the cold. Down in South Georgia the ice what will it do? It beat Napoleon.1 
Margaret Thatcher 
Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets. 
 Napoleon Bonaparte 
Evidently Thatcher had learned her history of the Napoleonic wars, she feared the power of 
the press as she did the winter for its capacity to halt the Task Force from taking the 
Falklands. She saw her Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, hounded out of office by the 
media early on in the conflict. She was not prepared to ‘lose the Falklands on TV’2 and face 
the end of her term as Prime Minister as Anthony Eden had because of the Suez Crisis in 
1956. Thatcher’s criticisms of parts of the press for expressing dissenting opinions is based 
upon her misguided impression that firstly, public opinion correlated directly to the stance of 
the media, and secondly that she could sufficiently influence the media.  
This thesis has shown that there were a complex variety of factors that affected what 
information was available to the public and just as importantly how it was conveyed to them. 
It was the presentation of this information that the foundational narratives were formed from 
and which the early historiography of the conflict was therefore based upon. With the 
Falklands War, one idea that some in the media and government sought to establish as 
axiomatic was that war was a positive force for re-energising the nation. Thatcher did not 
need to try to shape the media, it was a world largely policed from inside. History had taught 
the media the same lessons to those in government. As members of the war cabinet laid 
‘awake at night with visions of Suez’,3 so too were most of the press unwilling to criticise a 
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British military expedition since they had seen it cost newspapers with falls in circulation 
figures during Suez. The jingoism was a product of the media regarding it as the most likely 
way for them to make money, and to then promote that agenda in order to entertain as well as 
influence reader’s opinions to keep them buying the paper. 
Every possible view about the war existed in public domain, from vigorous opposition to 
flag-waving support. At the beginning the media too reflected these views, from The Mirror’s 
rejection of the conflict as an imperialist throwback, The Financial Time’s careful neutrality, 
The Guardian's focus on the potential costs of taking the Islands, through to the more vocal 
expressions of support from The Daily Mail, The Telegraph and The Times, to the outliers in 
terms of their jingoistic position, The Express and The Sun. Meanwhile, the BBC retained, as 
far as possible, a neutrality that subsequently got it into a lot of trouble. From the Falklands 
the collective inexperience of the Task Force correspondents, the military and technological 
restrictions, combined with the correspondents growing sense of association with the soldiers 
they were embedded with fostered a desire to see the troops (instead of the government) 
succeed. Through such processes, the reporting from the Task Force correspondents assumed 
a largely patriotic if sometimes jingoistic tone.   
As the campaign advanced and the task force assumed momentum, voices of opposition or 
caution were largely drowned out by the good news of military victory. In the face of mostly 
good news of victories and advances from the South Atlantic the media amplified the voices 
of those supporting progress and a positive outcome, they accentuated positives and masked 
negatives. Victory vindicated such jingoistic and belligerent rhetoric and helped to establish 
them as the foundational narratives, with those who were critical of the war labelled as 
‘traitors’.4 It was the same jingoistic papers that praised Thatcher’s handling of the conflict 
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and the supposed revival of the nation the conflict inspired. They helped embolden Thatcher 
and encouraged her to fight the unions after the battles in the Falklands had been won.  
The likes of Chomsky have argued that if a person’s reality is produced through what they 
know and if this is mediated through the prism of the media, then it suggest that it was one of 
the primary forces that conditioned people’s reality during the Falklands war.5 Such power 
would make the media presentation fundamental to explaining society late twentieth century 
Britain. This is too deterministic, it sees the public as subordinate to the elites in the media 
and government. After Winston Smith is tortured in George Orwell’s 1984, he finally 
submitted to the will of the party and is made to truly love Big Brother. With such a 
pessimistic ending it is possible to miss a critical point of the novel; despite Winston Smith 
living in a world where his every thought and action is observed, a world where thoughts are 
conditioned through the manipulation of language, he still has the capacity to emerge as a 
free-thinking individual who questions what he is told.6 The point is that if Winston Smith 
can be such a person in a totalitarian state, then the British people of 1982 did not exist in a 
state of false consciousness but were free thinking individuals that were not subject to the all-
encompassing power of the media. 
The ordinary daily life of individuals is difficult to account for, but what this thesis has 
attempted to do is to demonstrate that people are not simply numbers that can be categorised 
by one opinion that they may hold. People’s realities were made up by the infinite variables 
of their own experiences. In the Mass Observation responses there is evidence of forms of 
‘everyday resistance’;7 there were people who opposed the war and took in every piece of 
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information that they could,8 others mediated their perceptions by leaving the room if news 
reporting became too graphic.9  
Where one praised Max Hastings for the way that he reported the conflict,10 another felt that 
the only Task Force correspondent that was getting things right was Gareth Parry of the 
Guardian.11 Likewise, whereas some post-war depictions of the conflict have accepted the 
basic foundational narratives produced by the press,12 a number of artistic representations 
have tried to reveal alternate understandings and memories of the conflict. No one can 
criticise Simon Weston for the huge amount of good he has done for the cause of the 
wounded soldier, the problem is that his symbolic path to recovery has obscured other 
narratives that are not so positive. Weston has become synonymous with the Falklands War 
so that his story is one that is readily available within public discourse. This means that 
someone like Robert Lawrence, another badly wounded soldier, is relegated to insignificance.  
Members of the public were upset that the wounded were excluded from the London victory 
parades, recognising it as an attempt to mask bad news in order to promote the good news 
associated with victory.13 Similarly, little has been made of the contribution of non-white 
soldiers who fought in the Falklands, where the atypical soldier is Grant Mitchell from 
EastEnders and not like Reuben from For Queen and Country,14 nor Sapper Pradeep Gandhi, 
the only Asian to be killed during the conflict. This gives works such as Tumbledown15 and 
For Queen and Country, symbolic significance beyond the artistic and in to the realm of 
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resistance as they express forms of knowledge that for a multitude of reasons have been 
absent from the foundational narratives.  
According to Jean Baudrillard ‘people have become public’.16 During the Falklands War this 
was certainly true, the individual as a free thinking agent was denied in favour of the 
collective; national unity was promoted, division was shunned. The truth according to the 
elites and the media was that Britain had become great again by defending democracy against 
the fascists of Argentina. Dissent from this view made you unpatriotic, to some it made you 
the enemy. Later in the same essay Baudrillard asked ‘is it the media that fascinate the 
masses, or is it the masses who divert the media to showmanship’.17 In 1982 it was the latter; 
false conceptions of the imagined communities that the media were writing for reduced 
“people to the public” and in doing so placed them in categories which elites felt confident 
were true because the opinion polls told them so. Opinion polls obscure, they fail to elucidate 
the complex nature of public opinion, people are individuals, not numbers on a graph. The 
Falklands War did take place, but there is no single narrative, no singular truth, no one 
consequence, and this must be remembered. 
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17 Ibid., p.582. 
73 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A – Mass Observation Correspondents Data 
Reference Gender DoB Age During Falklands War 
C108 F 1936 46 
D156 F 1952 30 
G218 F 1946 36 
G226 F 1941 41 
N403 F 1937 45 
N470 M 1934 48 
R470 M 1934 48 
S496 F 1927 55 
W632 F 1941 41 
W633 F 1942 40 
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Appendix B - Images 
 
Image 1: Evidence of Argentinian Napalm. Source: Fox and Hanrahan, ‘I counted them all out and I counted them all back’: 
The Battle for the Falklands (London, 1982), Image 20. 
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Image 2: A photo of a British Soldier sharing a cup of Tea with Falkland Islanders. The image was widely circulated back 
home for the sense of normality it elicited. Source: Photograph taken by Tom Smith, Daily Express. 
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Image 3: A marine stands over the headless body of an Argentinian conscript. Source: Photograph taken by soldier Adrian 
Brown, 40 Commando.  
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Image 4: A wounded British soldier is carried by his fellow soldiers, his injuries can just be seen on his lower left leg. 
Source: Fox, ‘I counted them all out and I counted them all back’: The Battle for the Falklands (London, 1982), Image 24. 
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Image 5: The Sun, 'GOTCHA', 04 May 1982. 
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Image 6: Caption Reads ‘Anti-Falklands war demonstration in Oxford Street yesterday on their way to the headquarters of 
the BBC in London to object to its bias in excluding the views of people who want an immediate truce, negotiations and a 
stop to the war.’ Source: Morning Star, 10 May 1982. 
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Image 7.1: Caption reads ‘Step One: BLOCKADE… Warships seal off the Falkland Islands. The Argentinians are given 48 
hours to get out.’ Source: The Sun, 06 April 1982. 
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Image 7.2: Caption reads ‘Step Two... BATTLE… Navy opens fire on enemy ships and planes. Islands are starved of vital 
supplies.’ Source: The Sun, 06 April 1982. 
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Image 7.3: Caption reads ‘INVASION… Mass landings by Marines and Paratroopers “The enemy would have lost heart 
anyway by then”.’ Source: The Sun, 06 April 1982. 
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Image 8: The Sun, 'STICK IT UP YOUR JUNTA', 20 April 1982. 
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Image 9: Prince Andrew returning home from the Falkland Islands to a warm welcome. Source: V. Adams, The Falklands 
Conflict (London, 1998), p.67. 
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Image 10: Cartoon by Michael Cummings. Caption reads 'I wish our all-conquering Field Marshall could liberate the British 
islands from the Union Junta!' Source: Sunday Express, 26 June 1982. 
 
 
Image 11: Spitting Image depiction of Margaret Thatcher. Source: ITV/Rex Features. 
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Image 12.1: ‘WHEN WILL MANKIND LEARN THAT THERE ARE NO WINNERS AT THIS GAME?’ A collage 
produced during PTSD therapy at the Royal Naval Psychiatric Hospital, Haslar: Source: Manchester Art Galleries, The 
Falklands Factor: Representations of a Conflict (Manchester, 1989), p.32. 
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Image 12.2: 'BEFORE' and 'AFTER'. A collage produced during PTSD therapy at the Royal Naval Psychiatric Hospital, 
Haslar: Source: Manchester Art Galleries, The Falklands Factor: Representations of a Conflict (Manchester, 1989), p.32. 
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Image 12.3: '1982 OUR CONFLICT!' A collage produced during PTSD therapy at the Royal Naval Psychiatric Hospital, 
Haslar: Source: Manchester Art Galleries, The Falklands Factor: Representations of a Conflict (Manchester, 1989), p.26. 
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